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Abstract 
‘Resilience’ is a term that is increasingly being used regarding community 
development issues. It is a particular issue on Pacific Islands where development 
issues exist, and the exposure of communities to natural hazards is apparent. 
Climate change is increasingly affecting Pacific Island communities. Many 
Pacific Island communities live on low-lying atolls, and communities on ‘high’ 
islands are generally located close to the coast. Both sets of communities are 
therefore highly exposed to storm and high seas events. Additionally, earthquake, 
tsunami and volcanic hazards exist. Infrastructure is a key aspect of resilience. 
Policies and technical issues regarding infrastructure resilience globally are the 
subject of a literature review. Research presented compares the policies taken to 
resilient infrastructure in (Western) Samoa against those taken in American 
Samoa. These two territories shared common cultural histories until the 19
th
 
century, both are ‘high’ islands and both face a similar range of natural hazards 
faced due to their relative close proximity in the Pacific Ocean. Analysis 
highlights where lessons can be learnt both globally and from the Samoas’ 
approaches to resilient infrastructure. The lessons learnt in this thesis include the 
value of taking a holistic approach to disaster risk reduction, involving the 
community in hazard identification and disaster risk reduction, and working on 
these issues in a timely manner. Additionally, it is seen that careful long-term 
planning of land use with natural hazards in mind, which is found to be an 
economically sound approach, is of value in disaster risk reduction.   
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 An overview of this research  
This research focuses on disaster risk reduction and the resilience of 
infrastructure (roads, water and sanitation, power supply and communications 
equipment). The study will explore governmental approaches to analysing 
infrastructure resilience and the means of militating against disaster. As a means 
of analysis and comparison of approaches, the actions and approaches taken in 
the state of Samoa (formerly called ‘Western Samoa’, but from now on to be 
referred to simply as Samoa) are compared against the actions and approaches 
taken in American Samoa. Both island states had, until the nineteen century, a 
similar history. Both island states, located in a similar area of the Pacific Ocean, 
and both being ‘high’ islands, are subjected to similar natural hazards. The size 
of the population is greater in Samoa (around 179,000 in 2009) compared to 
American Samoa (around 66,000 in 2010). However in terms of analysis and 
comparison of policies and approaches to disaster risk reduction, this population 
difference is not seen to be significant. Due to the above similarities of 
geography and population, but being parts of differing political systems (Samoa 
independent, but aligned with New Zealand, and American Samoa being a 
dependent US territory), the comparison of approaches taken may be due to 
political and developmental reasons.  
 
This thesis is a policy analysis, a factor which affects the methodology chosen. 
The thesis presents a literature review that outlines ‘best practice’ for disaster 
risk reduction, both globally and specifically for Pacific Island states. The 
collection of information from the Samoas for the original research part of the 
thesis, focussing on a specific policy issue, is gathered from key informants. The 
voices chosen know the issues in some depth, and each person was able to 
comment with authority on the specific aspects of the work they are carrying out, 
explaining the reasons for the choices made and the results of the works carried 
out. Analysis and conclusions are taken from these strands of study.  
 
2 
The outputs of this thesis are a set of ‘lessons learnt’ regarding disaster risk 
reduction and infrastructure resilience. In one aspect, best practice for disaster 
risk reduction globally is relatively easily defined, with a strong set of 
authoritative documents produced by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme and other influential international organisations. The 
manner in which this best practice is implemented in-country however, specific 
to the Samoas, leads to a set of lessons learnt specific to the contexts on those 
island states, although these learnings are applicable to many Pacific Island 
states.  
 
 
1.2 Why this subject was chosen  
This subject allows investigation and learning in disaster risk reduction 
philosophies and practices globally, and particularly for the Pacific. A substantial 
quantity of research has recently been carried out globally into disaster risk 
reduction, driven by climate change and climate variability issues. Climate 
change is likely to affect large populations living in low-lying or vulnerable areas 
such as in the flood plains and river deltas of Bangladesh, or on Pacific Island 
(both ‘high’ islands or low-lying ones). Indeed, the very viability of low-lying 
countries such as the Maldives and Kiribati may be influenced by sea-level rise. 
Climate change therefore has the potential to have a large effect on individual 
populations, and the study on the influence of climate change on societies has 
driven this area of research. Climate change mitigation (ensuring lower carbon 
emissions are released to the atmosphere) is not directly addressed within this 
thesis, however as will be seen in Section 3.4.2, Vulnerabilities to natural 
hazards (for small island states), it is an influence on the choice of power 
sources for some small and remote islands. Climate change adaptation (changing 
practices or physical items, such as infrastructure) is more closely addressed 
within this thesis.  
 
The comparison of how the issue is addressed in Samoa (supported by Australia / 
New Zealand), against the approach taken in American Samoa (a US dependant 
territory) allows a relatively ‘pure’ comparison of two geographically close, 
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ethnically similar, but politically different countries. Parallel political systems 
may well give rise to different approaches to similar subjects, and this issue will 
be drawn out in this thesis, specific to infrastructure policies.  
 
As a first step, and in order to understand the demand for resilient infrastructure, 
the concept of vulnerability, and its corollary, resilience, is explored within the 
literature review (Section 3).  
 
This combination of development studies issues and civil engineering (both areas 
of study and interest to the author), alongside the geographical and political 
proximity of the issues in the thesis make this a relevant and timely thesis.  
 
 
1.3 Hazards in the Pacific, and their economic effects  
 
Statistics on disasters in the Pacific area are instructive. Bettencourt et al (2006, 
Table 1, p 2) summarise the natural hazards thus:   
 
Reported disasters in the Pacific Islands (1950 – 2004) 
 Number Reported 
fatalities 
Population 
affected 
Reported 
losses (in 
2004 US$, 
million) 
Windstorms  157 1,380 2,496,808 $5,903 
Droughts  10 0 629,580  $137 
Floods  8 40 246,644  $94 
Earthquakes  17 53 22,254 $330 
Others* 15 274 21,520 $60 
* ‘Others’ includes landslides, tsunamis, volcano eruptions, wild fires and 
epidemics.  
 
As can be seen from the table above, the large majority of reported disasters have 
been from climate related events, particularly windstorms (cyclones). This is of 
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interest, as it demonstrates why a considerable focus in the disaster risk 
management field has been on weather related events. It also demonstrates why 
an increasing weather related hazard, through the effects of climate change, will 
be of particular interest to the Pacific Islands.   
 
Economically, the effects on selected Pacific countries are demonstrated below:  
 
Estimated economic and social impact of disasters in selected Pacific Island 
countries (1950 – 2004) 
Country No. disasters 
reported 
Total reported 
losses (in 2004 
US$) 
Average 
population 
affected in 
disaster years 
Average 
impact on 
GDP (%) 
Fiji 38 $1,175,600,000 10.8% 7.7% 
Samoa 12 $743,400,000 42.2% 45.6% 
Vanuatu 37 $384,400,000 15.5% 30.0% 
Tonga 16 $171,100,000 42% 14.2% 
Source: Bettencourt et al (2006, p2)  
 
Although in New Zealand terms, the figures for total reported economic losses 
are not extreme, the percentage rates of population affected and the effect on the 
various economies of the various islands due to economic shocks is clear. As will 
be seen in Section 3.2, such economic losses to hazard events have marked 
consequences to the development of a community. With increasing vulnerability 
to hazards, both human and economic losses are likely to worsen.  
 
 
1.4 Post-disaster work and pre-disaster work  
In terms of disaster risk, practitioners divide the broader subject of Disaster Risk 
Management (DRM) into the narrower subjects of ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’ 
(DRR), normally focussed on the pre-event provision of trained staff, appropriate 
government systems and provision of resilient infrastructure and ‘Disaster 
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Management’ (DM), normally focussed on the post-disaster logistics of 
delivering aid to affected communities.  
 
Although different areas of work, often addressed by very different sets of 
expertise, the two areas of DRM do interact, as will be seen in Section 3.5.1: 
Long term planning against natural hazards. This is mostly in relation to long-
term infrastructure plans mitigating against hazards, but also providing necessary 
buildings or other infrastructure for response and recovery activities to be staged 
from, post disaster. This thesis is focused on the pre-event planning and delivery 
of resilient infrastructure, and is therefore very much aligned with the Disaster 
Risk Reduction field of work.  
 
 
1.5 Related worldwide research  
Research is ongoing on a number of issues that affect the subject of infrastructure 
vulnerability. These include the following areas.  
 
Climate change and variability has attracted a large quantity of research as will 
be seen in section 3.3.3.1. Research on climate change was largely initiated in the 
1990s and is becoming more sophisticated due to the improved capacity of 
computers that can process the vast quantities of data required to produce climate 
change models. Secondly, as the weather events of each year are measured and 
analysed, more data becomes available for matching the outputs of the research 
models against the actual observed weather patterns. This allows models to be 
calibrated more closely, and to be adapted to the climate changes observed, 
giving ever greater certainty as to how climate change and variability will affect 
the planet, and in specific locations.  
 
In addition to the research on changes in climate noted above, further research is 
ongoing into the physical effects of climate change and sea-level rise, including 
how far the sea is anticipated to rise, and the effects of this on wave levels and 
saltwater intrusion into freshwater systems on islands (see Section 3.4).  
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Other research is ongoing to the social effects of climate change on various 
communities worldwide. The fear of communities abandoning traditional lands, 
or of mortality from disasters, are the more extreme drivers of research into 
social effects. This will be seen further in Section 3.1, Population vulnerability to 
natural hazards.  
 
The above are merely the larger broad areas of research that inform the 
understanding of infrastructure vulnerability. There is also a wide range of 
related and associated research alongside the above areas of study.  
 
 
1.6 Overview of geopolitical history  
 
The following provides a brief geopolitical history of Samoa and American 
Samoa. This gives an understanding of why and how the two separate states 
became to be governed by two very separate political systems, despite sharing 
close geographical locations, and sharing similar ethnic and cultural histories.  
 
1.6.1 Samoa  
Samoa, as a Polynesian island group, was very much subject to patterns of 
population, contact and trading during the early Polynesian / European contact 
period. Samoa is perhaps slightly less typical of other Polynesian island groups 
in that it has had affiliations with a number of outside countries. Early trading 
was carried out between the Polynesian people and variously British, American 
and German traders, amongst others. As trade and missionary activity increased, 
and without (to the Europeans’ perspective) an individual Samoan in control of 
the islands, relative chaos ensued, with at least seven attempts to create 
governments between 1876 and 1889 (Campbell, 2003). Civil war and rebellions 
ensued. A conference between the United States, Germany and Britain (notably, 
without Samoan input) decided that Samoa should be an independent nation, and 
the Swedish monarch was chosen as a neutral person who could identify a 
Samoan head of state. The Samoan chosen, Malietoa Laupepa was ineffectual 
and lasted effectively only a few years until a rebellion. In amongst this, the 
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dominant trading company, Godeffroys, which had strong German links, wielded 
some level of political power within the country.  
 
In 1899, Germany and the United States agreed on the partition of Samoa, with 
‘Western Samoa’ (now Samoa) claimed by Germany, due to a great deal to the 
activities of the Godeffroys trading company. American interests in Eastern 
Samoa (now American Samoa) were chiefly around the strategic value to the 
United States of the port of Pago Pago. The German rule of Samoa lasted just 14 
years. Due to the effects of both the First and Second World Wars, military 
control of the ‘Eastern Pacific’ was taken by the British Empire. In 1947, 
Samoan and New Zealand political interests aligned, and New Zealand 
effectively became the colonising country of Samoa. New Zealand took a 
relatively progressive line regarding the control of the country, creating reforms 
which led, as early as 1952 to the creation of a timetable for movement  towards 
full independence, which was finally achieved on 1 January 1962 (Campbell, 
2003). A treaty of friendship, signed by a representative of each country, 
affirmed an “intimate” relationship between the two countries with, for example, 
New Zealand taking on various foreign policy tasks on behalf of Samoa, and 
allowing “equitable treatment” of the respective nations’ citizens.  
 
Although independent, Samoa has retained a strong connection with New 
Zealand. This is partly due to the above political and trading machinations, but 
also largely because the two countries are both Polynesian nations. Many 
Samoans live and work in New Zealand, further strengthening the cultural 
connections between the two countries.  
 
It is for the above reasons that Samoa has retained a strong political and cultural 
connection with New Zealand, perhaps more so than with any other external 
nation.  
 
1.6.2 American Samoa   
Eastern Samoa, now American Samoa, was claimed by the United States in the 
late 19
th
 Century. Although culturally and ethnically close to Samoa, since the 
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time of that claim by the United States, Samoa and American Samoa have taken 
varying political directions.  
 
On gaining control of Eastern Samoa (from now on in this thesis, to be known as 
American Samoa), the United States made “no philosophical or ideological 
pretensions” (Campbell, 2003). Until the First World War, American Samoa was 
administered by the US Navy, with a succession of Naval Commanders taking 
governance of the territory, each for two-year stints. The Commanders generally 
took a paternalistic approach, treating the local population as child-like and in 
need of protection. This situation was apparently not particularly challenged by 
the local population. The benefit, from the US point of view, in being in 
American Samoa was the use of the port at Pago Pago. No particular economic 
potential was seen by the US in the remainder of American Samoa, and therefore 
the US Navy was the only significant economic/trading activity in the country, 
apart from relatively low levels of copra trading, which were also administered 
largely by the US Navy. The US Navy retained effective governance of 
American Samoa until 1951, at which time the US Department of the Interior 
took governance. Whilst Washington made some moves towards creating 
independence for American Samoa, these were not actively supported by the 
local population, who preferred to retain the benefits of budgetary support and 
relatively free access for the population to the United States mainland. It was not, 
however, until 1975 that a governor was first elected for American Samoa.  
 
In the above way, American Samoa has retained political alignment with the 
United States of America, with political and administrative systems coming from 
the US. Of particular note is the continued involvement of the US Department of 
the Interior, which administers the ‘American Flag’ nation. ‘American Flag’ 
states in the Pacific are: American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas, Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Pulau. Whilst American Samoa has not 
been integrated into the US as a State (as has Hawai’i), it remains under the 
control and protection of the United States. Those born in American Samoa to 
American Samoan parents may take United States nationality, which allows them 
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to reside and work in the United States, but not citizenship. This means that they 
cannot vote in State or Federal elections in the United States.  
 
In the above way, it can be seen that although culturally and ethnically strongly 
aligned with other Polynesian islands and peoples, particularly with its near-
neighbour Samoa, politically, American Samoa runs along markedly different 
lines to other Polynesian islands in the region, strongly aligned to US political 
systems.  
 
 
1.7 Outline plan of this thesis 
 
After this initial introduction, Chapter Two describes the methodology used for 
the information gathering and analysis in this thesis. A literature review is 
included in Chapter Three, which demonstrates the knowledge and understanding 
on resilient infrastructure globally, then more specifically for small island states 
and then specifically for Pacific Island states. It concludes by capturing ‘best 
practice’ for the study and analysis of resilient infrastructure, applicable for 
Pacific Island states, which clearly covers the Samoan and American Samoan 
contexts. Based on an understanding of this best practice, Chapters Four, Five 
and Six outline the practices and policies taken in Samoa and American Samoa, 
and by external governments, United Nations and International Finance 
Institutions regarding resilient infrastructure in the Samoas. The approaches 
taken are compared to the best practice identified in Chapter three. An analysis of 
the approaches taken is presented in Chapter Seven, including the development 
of what lessons can be learnt by the Samoas themselves, and lessons which can 
be taken by other organisations and locations relevant to other contexts. Final 
conclusions are presented in Chapter Eight.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY  
 
 
This chapter outlines the author’s positionality as a means of giving context to 
how the author has understood and carried out the analysis within this thesis. 
This will be seen to be particularly relevant in that the author’s past experience as 
an engineer has given context and undoubtedly affected his view on resilient 
infrastructure. The chapter then outlines the background to the analysis within 
the thesis, demonstrating why specific analysis methods were chosen for this.  
 
2.1 My positionality and positioning this thesis 
To give context to the approach that the author has taken to this thesis, the 
following is an explanation of his background, work experience and past study, 
as this has a large effect on how he has approached this subject, and his 
understanding of some of the issues faced.  
 
I was brought up in the United Kingdom, where I attended school and university. 
I am from what would be termed a ‘middle class’ environment. I have a 
Bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering, a Masters of Business Administration 
and a Masters of Water and Environmental Management (for developing 
countries and low-cost contexts).  
 
My work experience has been in both ‘developed’ civil engineering 
environments, principally in road construction and maintenance, and in the 
‘humanitarian contexts’ of Ethiopia and Uzbekistan, where I performed work on 
engineering and public health projects. Apart from living in New Zealand for the 
past six years, I have no experience of living and working in Pacific countries.  
 
All of the above has shaped the way in which I view the world and the way in 
which I approach subjects. This aspect should be borne in mind in the reading of 
this thesis. It should be noted that I am effectively an ‘outside observer’ of 
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policies produced by, and affecting, Samoa and American Samoa, but one able to 
draw upon my professional experience as an engineer.  
 
The sectors of development studies and civil engineering do not often cross, even 
though the two sectors have much common ground. Development studies looks 
at holistic political systems whereas the civil engineering field may be seen as 
one of the key implementers of the resulting policies. The skill-sets of these two 
sectors are different (social sciences and technical/science) which is why the 
sectors rarely cross. The contribution of this thesis may be seen as providing a 
bridge between these two parallel sectors of work. Overall it must be stressed 
however that this is a development studies thesis, and even though I have the 
civil engineering technical training, this thesis looks in a holistic manner at the 
development studies related field of policy.  
 
 
2.2 Analysis method choice 
 
This thesis includes a policy analysis. This factor shapes the nature of the 
literature review, the collection of data and the resulting analysis. As a policy 
review, the collection of original information for analysis is from both key 
documents and authoritative voices for each of the island states of Samoa and 
American Samoa.   
 
The nature of policy analysis is key to the choice of information gathering and 
analysis methods. For policy on resilient infrastructure, as in many other fields, 
there are choices regarding policies taken by governments. These policies can 
concentrate on specific issues or can concentrate on specific communities, or on 
why or how to engage with communities. As such, there is no underlying ‘truth’ 
or ‘concrete conclusion’ as could be found in a ‘hard science’ thesis. The policies 
taken by different governments or organisations in different contexts are often a 
product of the social context, with resulting meanings and policy choices. 
Further, as demonstrated in the positionality statement at the start of this Chapter, 
the author also has his own understanding of resilient infrastructure issues, and is 
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therefore not an objective outsider to this sector, but effectively a part of the 
engineering and development sectors, and therefore a part of this research.  
 
The nature of the information gathering and analysis within this thesis means that 
a quantitative analysis cannot be taken for this thesis with an expectation of 
concrete results. Rather, given the meanings taken by individuals in key positions 
at the relevant government bodies and relevant organisations, a qualitative 
research method has been undertaken. The literature review has been carried out 
based on qualitative information gathering. Similarly the information gathering 
specific to Samoa and American Samoa has been carried out from both key 
informants in specific governmental and other organisations, and from reports or 
documents recommended for viewing by these informants. Most of these 
documents were available publically, often on the internet, whilst some 
documents were viewed in final draft format.  
 
Interviews with key informants were carried out face-to-face where possible, 
however due to the locations of some informants, some interviews were carried 
out by telephone, or where not convenient, by e-mail exchange. The locations 
and availability of the relevant informants meant that information gathered for 
Samoa was by telephone or face-to-face contact with key consultant staff, and by 
e-mail with the Samoan Government employee. All contact with American 
Samoan Government department staff was by e-mail exchange. All of the above 
contacts were under a structured interview format, with follow-up contact made 
where any clarification or additional information was required.  
 
The information gathered from the Literature Review in Chapters 3 to 6 is 
analysed in Chapter 7, where the approaches and policies taken within, and for, 
the respective countries are compared with each other and with other related 
contexts. This analysis leads to a set of lessons that can be learnt both from the 
individual countries and from a comparison between the two approaches taken in 
and for Samoa and American Samoa. Again, the analysis is carried out on a 
qualitative basis as quantitative methods were not relevant to the style of 
information gathered. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the above analysis and 
presented in Chapter 8.  
13 
 
 
2.3 Interviews for information gathering   
Informants of original information for this thesis were found through personal 
contacts with this thesis writer, and from introductions from those contacts.  A 
list of participants, and the manner in which they were ‘found’ (or introduced to 
the author) is presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Information gathered  
The contacts were knowledgeable in their subject areas, and due to their 
positions and understanding of the work carried out by the American Samoan 
and Samoan Governments, it was not considered necessary to seek additional 
contacts regarding this subject matter.  
 
All of those approached, as above, agreed to participate in the research. There 
were no refusals to participate. All will be supplied with a copy of this thesis, 
when finalised.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This chapter sets the context for the remainder of this thesis, describing the 
choice of a definition of ‘infrastructure’, as different organisations and contexts 
require their own specific descriptions of infrastructure. Further contextual 
descriptions are given for hazards, with choices of the types of hazards chosen 
for analysis. One of the key issues within this chapter however is a description of 
the concept of the vulnerability of communities to natural hazards. As will be 
seen, there has been an evolution of thought on this concept, starting in around 
the 1970s. Once these basic concepts are described, the chapter then 
demonstrates understandings of vulnerability of communities to natural hazards 
firstly at a global, generic, level. Literature specific to natural hazards on small 
island states is then presented, as this gives context to understandings of why 
small island states are particularly vulnerable. Finally, literature specific to 
community vulnerabilities to natural hazards on Pacific Islands is presented. The 
above information demonstrates present thinking on ‘best practice’ for 
community vulnerability to natural hazards. 
 
The above information sets the basis of understanding and context for the 
remainder of this thesis.  
 
 
3.1 Basic definitions and scope  
3.1.1 What is meant by ‘resilience’?  
There are many definitions of resilience. One such example is provided by the 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2012): “The 
ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions.” Alternatively, the New Zealand Treasury has adopted 
the following wording “The ability of a system to withstand or recover quickly 
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from a significant disruption.” Whilst the exact wording for a definition of 
resilience (or vulnerability) may be debated, the key test for the concept of 
resilience is how it may be measured. A measurable definition would provide 
greater certainty of the concept. However there is currently no commonly agreed 
measurable definition of resilience. This aspect is explored further in Section 
3.2.2.  
 
The words ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ have been used increasingly in the past 
decades, whilst the field of disaster risk reduction has been developed. The two 
words are the corollary of each other, and both are widely used. Some in the field 
prefer the use of ‘resilience’, implying the positive aspects of community 
empowerment, and this word appears to be increasing in usage in comparison to 
the more negatively focussed ‘vulnerability’.  
 
3.1.2 Focusing on the medium and large scale hazards  
What is meant in this context by a disaster or natural hazard? There is a scale of 
disaster from the household level (injuries from isolated or minor hazards) up to 
the global. Minor-scale events are not generally the subject of infrastructure 
policy. The smallest type of event that would be captured by disaster risk 
reduction policy would be minor and frequent events, such as rivers that cause 
repeat damage to a road. At the very large scale, there have been a number of 
global events during the earth’s history with massive and widespread 
consequences, such as the event that killed much dinosaur life on earth. Wisner 
et al (2004: p37) note that there have been five mass-extinction events over the 
past 400 million years. These massive events are too huge for infrastructure or 
social adaptation systems to mitigate against, and as such, are too large for the 
context disaster risk reduction, or of this thesis.  
 
This thesis is therefore aimed at the ‘medium scale’ event in comparison to the 
extreme examples given above. It is aimed at the types of hazards and events for 
which policies regarding the resilience of infrastructure can have an effect. Such 
events include earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic and weather events such as 
cyclones or tropical storms and their follow-on effects such as flooding and 
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landslips. Disasters, as approached in this thesis, are those events that affect 
human life and infrastructure resulting from the above range of natural hazards.  
 
There is a substantial and authoritative literature on the identification and 
analysis of natural hazards, typified by texts by Smith and Petley (2009), Tobin 
and Montz (1997) and Burby (1998). These texts provide a framework for 
analysing hazards, and work towards mitigating their effects from a technical 
standpoint.  
 
 
3.1.3 What is infrastructure in this context?  
There is a variety of definitions of ‘infrastructure’. Most definitions relate to 
physical assets such as:   
 roads and transport facilities  
 water treatment facilities and supply pipework  
 wastewater pipework and treatment works  
 energy supply facilities 
 solid waste facilities  
 seawalls and  
 communications equipment (including fibre optics and associated 
cabling).  
 
Some definitions, particularly from highly industrialised contexts, provide wider 
definitions. Parfomak (2008) and O’Rourke (2009), writing for the USA context, 
both include the above physical resources, but extend the concept to include less 
tangible infrastructure such as banking and internet networks.  
 
Infrastructure resilience in the Pacific, and the focus of this thesis, is purely on 
the physical infrastructure outlined above. Although banking systems certainly 
exist in the Samoas, it is not the type of infrastructure that would normally be 
affected by weather or natural hazard events, and is therefore not the subject of 
normal infrastructure resilience studies in this context.  
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3.1.4 What is infrastructure vulnerable to?  
Different sets of infrastructure will be vulnerable to different sets of natural 
hazards. In general, roads are generally more susceptible to water hazards, such 
as flooding, wash-out and coastal effects. Overhead cables for power supply may 
be vulnerable to high winds but resilient to seismic hazards, with buried cables 
more vulnerable to seismic events. Water and wastewater pipework may be 
resilient to wind storms, but vulnerable to water wash-out or blockage resulting 
from run-off of sand and silt from rain storms. As can be seen, each set of 
infrastructure can have differing vulnerabilities to specific hazards. Further, 
overhead power lines, for example, will traverse different kinds of landscapes, 
each posing different natural hazards. This means that, in terms of disaster risk 
reduction, specific items of infrastructure should be analysed according to the 
risk they face from exposure to the varying natural hazards of the terrain they 
pass through.  
 
 
3.2 Population vulnerability to natural hazards  
3.2.1 How development projects affect vulnerability 
3.2.1.1 The concept of vulnerability  
Studies by Wisner et al (2003) and UNDP (2004) demonstrate how exposure to a 
hazard is different to human vulnerability to natural hazards. To be vulnerable to 
the hazard, a person must both be exposed to the potential hazard and be 
vulnerable to the effects of that hazard. Consider the examples of two island 
states, Haiti (GDP $1,200) and Japan (GDP $34,200) (CIA, 2011). Both have 
suffered significant earthquakes in the recent past. The infrastructure, including 
buildings, in Haiti did not perform well in a Richter 7.0 seismic event causing 
230,000 deaths (BBC, 2010). In Japan however, with the much larger Richter 9.0 
event, there was a total of 10,000 deaths, with only around 2,000 of these 
estimated to be from the earthquake, the reminder of deaths resulting from the 
following tsunami (Next Big Future, 2011). The population exposed to the events 
was very different (higher in Japan), and the magnitudes of the disasters also 
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different (larger in Japan), but the mortality rates were much lower in Japan. This 
example outlines how human vulnerability to one natural hazard, earthquakes, 
has provided clearly different outcomes for two populations. The same concept 
remains relevant for the exposure to other natural hazards such as flooding, 
cyclones and landslips. Potential exposure to each of these hazards is faced by 
many populations in many countries, however the mortality rates are different in 
each country, depending on the vulnerability of the respective populations to that 
risk. This vulnerability often depends on the resilience of the infrastructure and 
buildings in the relevant context.  
 
Following this logic, it is therefore insufficient to state after a disaster that 
infrastructure was lost as a result of a natural hazard. Rather it is better to state 
that the infrastructure was in a location at risk from the natural hazard in the first 
place, or was designed to standards insufficient to withstand the hazard. 
 
The above demonstrates vulnerability from a fairly technical viewpoint. As will 
be seen in Section 3.4.3.2, there is an opposing view that, rather than seeing 
populations as vulnerable, even passive, to hazards, community coping 
mechanisms provide resilience. Both views have merit, and perhaps this is the 
meeting point between the ‘civil engineering’ world (technical analysis of 
hazards and of provision of infrastructure) and the ‘development’ world (human 
geography and analysis as to the responses of individuals and communities to 
hazards and risk). This aspect will be drawn out further throughout this Chapter.  
 
 
3.2.1.2 Development and vulnerability  
The relationship between development and human vulnerability is an interesting 
one. The UNDP (2004) report outlines how the vulnerability of populations to 
natural hazards is different to human development, but can sometimes be 
strongly correlated to it. The UNDP developed two coarse measurement tools 
that demonstrate this relationship. The examples of Japan and Haiti again are 
informative. Consider the figures given in Table 1, below. These figures 
demonstrate that the long-term decisions taken in development (including 
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infrastructure decisions) in Japan, coupled with higher access to resources, has 
led to a high level of resilience to natural hazards, as demonstrated by higher 
‘relative vulnerability’ figures. Conversely, the lower level of relative 
development (as measured according to the UN human development index) in 
Haiti or, for example Armenia, is correlated to populations more vulnerable to 
natural hazards.  
 
 Human Development Index 
(average 1980 to 2000) (low 
figure demonstrates lower 
human development) 
Relative vulnerability to 
earthquakes (low figure 
demonstrates low vulnerability)  
Japan 0.928 2.81 
Mexico 0.790 103 
Armenia 0.745 7653 
Haiti 0.467 (no figure given, pre 2010 
earthquake, but likely now to be 
high)  
(Source: UNDP, 2004) 
Table 3-1 – Human Development and Vulnerability 
 
The above UN assessment system of ranking human development, and of 
ranking vulnerability to natural hazards, does bring up one other interesting set of 
data, in that some states have moderate human development index rankings 
(Mexico 0.790 average, 1980 to 2000), but relatively higher vulnerability to 
natural hazards (relative vulnerability 103). This demonstrates that gains in 
human development in Mexico may be at risk from natural hazard events.  
 
As shown above, the UNDP (2004) text outlines that at country-level, many 
poorer populations are more vulnerable to natural hazards than richer ones, a 
result that Freeman and Warner (2001) agree with. Milch et al (2010) investigate 
this concept at a community level, with a study outlining the effects on a 
population from an earthquake in Peru in 2007. This study found that women, the 
very young and very old had the highest mortality rates as a direct result of the 
earthquake. Further, the study demonstrated a correlation between living 
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conditions and educational attainment with displacement of people after the 
earthquake. Even though equally exposed to the same hazard, the more 
vulnerable members of the population suffered more. For a different hazard, 
Khan (2011) noted that low-income people who were dwelling in the cheaper 
land area of a floodplain were the most affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan.  
 
3.2.1.3 Economic losses 
“Any development activity has the potential to either increase or decrease 
disaster risk.” (UNDP, 2004)  
 
Losses from disasters are not just human. A number of authors, including Wisner 
et al (2003) outline the increasing economic losses that are due to natural hazard 
events. Indeed, Freeman and Warner (2001) suggest that many of the economic 
gains made through development are being wiped out by the effects of natural 
hazard events, mainly in low-income environments. Both Benson (2009) for the 
case of the Philippines and Silbert (2010) for the case of small islands, go on to 
outline that in some cases the costs incurred in the post-event response and 
recovery from natural hazard events can reduce government budgets for 
education and health services, impacting further on long-term economic 
development and growth.  
 
Due both to human and economic losses, Freeman and Warner (2001) and the 
UNDP (2004) outline that disaster risk reduction should be mainstreamed into 
development at an early stage in order to mitigate against its larger effects. For 
example, town planning and infrastructure initiatives must take hazard 
identification into account at an early stage, as is more likely to have occurred in 
Japan than in Haiti. In this manner the long-term vulnerability of populations to 
natural hazards can be decreased.  
 
3.2.2 Measuring vulnerability to natural hazards  
Apart from the Vulnerability Index calculated by the UNDP, as seen in section 
3.2.1.2 above, a number of attempts have been made to measure vulnerability to 
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natural hazards. An early example of this was a study carried out by Kaly et al 
(1999) which attempted to measure, at a country level, environmental 
vulnerability, which included vulnerability to natural hazards. The authors 
piloted a tool for measuring environmental vulnerability in three Pacific 
countries – Australia, Tuvalu and Fiji. A similar concept, on a much wider scale, 
was followed in the UNDP (2004) study in which a ‘Disaster Risk Index’ (DRI) 
was calculated for each country in an effort to define the vulnerability of each 
country. The DRI is, by the UNDP’s own admission, relatively ‘coarse’ and 
broad-brush in that it focuses on only three natural hazards: earthquakes, tropical 
cyclones and floods. Further, the DRI was calculated only from mortality rates, 
as these were the only relatively accessible and reliable data sets available for the 
study (UNDP, 2004: p32).  
 
The above studies measured vulnerability at the country level, and were 
necessarily coarse in their approach. Other studies have attempted to measure 
vulnerability at a finer level with assessments at the individual level, which could 
be collated up to community or group levels. One such study was carried out by 
Birkmann and Ing (2008) in Sri Lanka which provided enough detail to 
demonstrate that the ability to recover from the 2004 tsunami did not depend on 
an individual’s income or resources, rather on the income and resources at the 
household level. Another study was carried out by Mustafa et al (2011) which 
mapped vulnerability from material, institutional and attitudinal causes. This 
study provided enough detail to show that data could be collected that would 
demonstrate social interdependencies. Neither of these individual or community 
level studies were extended to country-level studies.  
 
Silbert (2010) suggests that mortality may not be the most appropriate measure 
of vulnerability to natural hazards, due to the nature of measurement that it 
provides. Instead she argues that financial loss could be a measurement tool. This 
is a factor that the UNDP address within their logic for choosing mortality as a 
measurement factor, as financial loss can be hard to calculate from a specific 
disaster. Direct economic losses from factors such as damaged infrastructure can 
be relatively easily calculated. However secondary effects such as loss of 
economic activity can be hard to calculate. Further, reporting by governments 
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can sometimes skew reported losses, with in extreme cases governments 
overstating losses (as a ploy to attract recovery resources) or understating losses 
(to ‘cover over’ politically damaging issues). The UNDP recognise that their 
mortality measurement method is coarse, but found it to be the most reliable for 
country-level studies.  
 
The above highlights that it is difficult and time-intensive to measure 
vulnerability at the individual level, but country-wide assessments can provide 
insights into general vulnerability to natural hazards at country/economic level.  
 
Of the above studies and measurement tools, only the report of the UNDP study 
makes reference to infrastructure resilience. None of the above tools include 
infrastructure resilience as a measurement factor of vulnerability. This may be a 
factor of the complexity of measuring vulnerability to infrastructure failure, 
across different locations and different forms of infrastructure (roads, power 
etc.).  
 
 
3.2.3 Factors driving vulnerability  
A number of factors drive vulnerability to natural hazards including exposure to 
a physical hazard (earthquake, cyclone etc.), human induced hazards 
(environmental damage from logging, waste management etc.), poor governance, 
violent conflict, gender and age vulnerabilities.  
 
Wisner et al (2003) suggest that a person’s risk of disaster is a factor of exposure 
to a natural hazard multiplied by their vulnerability. The vulnerability may be 
due to low income, few family connections, poor governance issues or other 
societal issues. If someone is not exposed to a natural hazard, there is little 
hazard risk. Alternatively, if they are located close to a hazard and are vulnerable 
due to any, or all, of the above social factors, they are at higher risk.  
 
Looking at a specific event, Yeo and Blong (2010) looked back at one flooding 
event in Fiji in 1931 which neatly encapsulated the concepts raised by Wisner et 
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al. A hurricane and associated flood caused the deaths of 225 people, mainly in 
the North West coast of the island of Viti Levu. Only 24 of the deaths of this 
disaster were native Fijians, who had built their houses in safer locations that 
were less affected by the extreme weather event. Additionally, many were able to 
swim and many knew to climb up within the structures of their dwellings during 
the event. In contrast, the immigrant Indian population suffered 152 deaths as 
they were living in flimsy houses in more hazardous flood plain areas and 
generally could not swim. Reinforcing the benefit of local indigenous 
knowledge, as seen in the case of Fiji, above, Yeo and Blong also note the case 
in 1852 in which Aborigines in Australia warned European settlers against 
settling in a flood plain. During one severe storm event, the Aborigines were able 
to lead many Europeans to safety, although 89 died as a result of the flooding 
event.  
 
Although many studies demonstrate the more system-wide causes of 
vulnerability, and imply some of the reliance on infrastructure, none make 
explicit links between them. Bosher and Dainty (2011) refer to this link, detailing 
how the design and construction of infrastructure can make it more resilient, and 
therefore provide greater resilience for communities. They demonstrate that in 
order to provide resilient infrastructure, a holistic view must be taken, including 
both the technical (infrastructure) and social aspects of vulnerability of a 
community, and that addressing individual factors of vulnerability may not 
address overall risk. For this reason, they outline that in order to reduce risk, 
communities should be involved in the identification and implementation of risk 
reduction efforts. This allows for a more holistic approach to analysing a 
community’s vulnerability to natural hazards, in association with wider 
development issues.  
 
With a separate focus, Nathan (2008) investigates societies’ perceptions of risk, 
including people’s perceptions of hazards. If people are not aware of the hazard, 
particularly if it is not visible, they will not be able to address it. Nathan found 
that people tend to neglect low-probability high-consequence risks (as many 
natural hazards are) in favour of high-probability low-consequence risk (such as 
personal security risks). This issue has an impact on societies’ treatment of 
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hazards, and also goes some way to explain why indigenous knowledge with 
longer-term perspectives of hazards leads to greater resilience to natural hazard 
events. Bankhoff and Hilhorst (2009) follow this theme further, noting that 
governments can have differing approaches to risk, giving the example in the 
Philippines of a government controlled evacuation of a community in the face of 
a volcanic eruption, whilst failing to act upon the more apparent and ongoing risk 
of poor traffic safety on the roads. These different views of risk shape people’s 
actions before, during and after emergencies. 
 
The key factors that can be seen to drive vulnerability to natural hazards can 
therefore be seen to be exposure to a hazard, poverty, poor governance, a lack of 
planning for disaster and low awareness of risk levels specific to natural hazards 
(at government, community and individual levels).  
 
 
3.3 Natural hazards  
Natural disasters can be broadly categorised into slow onset, rapid onset and 
evolving disasters. A broad categorisation of each follows.  
 
3.3.1 Slow-onset disasters 
Slow-onset disasters, as the name suggests, include disasters that do not have a 
clear or immediate start or end. These may include long-term weather effects 
such as drought and a potentially resulting famine. Such long-term events can 
have profound effects on the resident populations. Droughts can lead to crop 
failures, requiring replenishment of food stocks, or in more severe cases, can lead 
to population movements. A number of authors, summarised by Boston, Nel and 
Righarts (2009), make a connection between such stressed environments and a 
higher likelihood of armed conflict, as factions of populations, or outsiders, 
attempt to control viable land or specific resources such as water sources. In 
more general terms, Wisner et al (2003) put forward that the richer segments of 
societies may be able to escape slow-onset disasters as they may have the funds 
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to relocate, or buy additional food or access to water. The poorer segments of 
societies may not have such funds, and may therefore be unable to escape.  
 
Another form of slow-onset disasters may be armed conflict. Armed conflict may 
or may not have anything to do with natural resources, but for the populations 
caught in the cross-fire, the effects of an armed conflict may have similarities to 
the effects of a natural hazard event. Armed conflicts are commonly termed as 
‘complex emergencies’.  
 
Although slow-onset disasters, as described above, may have profound effects on 
populations, they do not often have significant widespread effects on 
infrastructure. As such, they are considered less within this thesis than rapid-
onset hazards, which more often have effects on infrastructure.  
 
3.3.2 Rapid-onset  
Rapid-onset disasters are those that commence with little or no warning. They 
are normally categorised as events that include storm and weather related events, 
and their resulting effects such as floods and landslips. Other rapid-onset 
disasters may include geophysical events such as earthquake, volcanic events and 
tsunami. Although some notice may be possible before such events happen, this 
is normally limited to perhaps a couple of days in the case of a large storm event, 
or perhaps a few hours in the case of a distant-source tsunami. Other events may 
have virtually no warning signs, such as near-source tsunami, earthquakes and 
some volcanic events.  
 
Due to the lack of warning of such rapid-onset events, Wisner et al (2004) put 
forward that they are ‘community levellers’, affecting wider spectrums of 
society. Other hazard events, for example an earthquake event that strikes a town 
or region, may more truly be the ‘community leveller’ outlined by Wisner et al.  
 
In any case, rapid-onset events are those that have the greatest effect on 
infrastructure. Road networks are particularly vulnerable to storm events, with 
the resulting floods, river action and landslips. Earthquakes particularly affect 
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surface-level and buried infrastructure, such as roads, water, wastewater and 
stormwater infrastructure, particularly in areas where liquefaction is an issue. 
Clearly tsunamis will affect infrastructure at the coastline rather than inland, 
however coastline infrastructure may include road networks (particularly on 
‘high’ Pacific islands where the road network may effectively be a coastal road 
around the island) and ports. Due to the stronger effects of rapid-onset events on 
infrastructure, this thesis is most concerned with rapid-onset hazards.  
 
3.3.3 Evolving disasters  
Climate change may be considered to be an evolving disaster, whilst urbanisation 
may be considered a factor in changing, long-term, people’s vulnerability to 
hazards. This is explained further, as follows.  
 
3.3.3.1 Climate change  
Related to both rapid and slow-onset events is the evolving dynamic of climate 
change and climate variability. The effects of climate change can be seen in 
changing weather patterns across the Pacific, making some areas drier, some 
wetter, and almost all locations subject to more extreme and frequent weather 
events. Jones (2001) outlines the specifics of how computer models have been 
generated to predict the effects of climate change. Due to the computer power 
available in 2001 however, the coarse granularity of the resulting information did 
not allow specific country or location analysis. Instead, analysis was only 
available on a regional basis. As computer power becomes greater, climate 
change models are becoming more reliable and able to predict with greater 
certainty the long-term effects of climate change. In addition to greater computer 
modelling capacity, as each year’s worth of weather passes over us, the models 
can be more closed correlated to weather patterns. This allows greater certainty 
in predicting how weather-based hazards may impact on specific locations, and 
therefore provides greater certainty for the design of infrastructure. 
 
It is worth defining two terms that are increasingly being used relating to climate. 
The first is ‘climate change’, the term used for long-term changes in temperature, 
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affecting, for example, the temperature of the oceans or atmosphere. The second 
term is ‘climate variability’ which refers to effects such as changing seasonalities 
(wetter winters, drier summers) or more extreme weather events (high winds).  
 
Despite advances in the measurement and modelling of climate change, 
uncertainty remains as to its likely final effect. Due to this uncertainty, Willows 
and Connell (2003), the UKCIP (2005) and Sussman and Freed (2008) have 
created decision frameworks for deciding on adaptation steps that can be taken 
regarding climate change. Due to the long-term nature of climate change, there 
are a number of actions that can be taken at any stage of development that can be 
termed as ‘no regrets’ actions. These include, for example, designing 
infrastructure to take into account potential long-term effects of climate change, 
particularly if they can be delivered for the same, or at least a similar cost, and 
particularly if they provide other benefits regarding resilience of infrastructure. It 
is the aim of most infrastructure designs to take ‘no-regrets’ decisions that 
provide high resilience at minimal additional cost. The reality is however, that 
even if the designer has taken climate change into account, most infrastructure 
requires some incremental additional cost to ‘climate-proof’ the infrastructure. 
Such approaches can be seen in more detail in Section 3.4.3.  
 
3.3.3.2 Urbanisation 
Campbell (2010) outlines the increasing urbanisation of some islands in the 
Pacific. Urbanisation can result in greater vulnerability to natural hazards. This is 
because of the greater environmental resource required to supply urban areas 
(with a concentration of power and water supplies), and because more people are 
concentrated in one area, which, if hit by a hazard, makes more people 
vulnerable from that event. Campbell suggests that most existing emergency 
planning has been directed at rural populations, again adding to the risk for urban 
populations. Long term planning initiatives gain relatively little support in many 
locations, particularly low-income ones, which means that housing and 
community buildings continue to be built, or maintained, in vulnerable locations. 
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One of the clear messages of the UNDP (2004) document ‘Reducing disaster 
risk: A challenge for development’ is that good town planning is a significant 
factor in reducing the vulnerability of populations to natural hazards. For 
example, by preventing people from living in gullies or at-risk flood-plains, 
populations will not be living in hazardous locations. Similarly, for Pacific island 
settings, town planning may be a good tool in preventing populations living in 
more vulnerable coastal locations. It is for this reason that the UNDP advocates 
for good local governance and enforcement, as such long-term plans can direct 
‘good’ choices by local authorities as to what locations may be most suitable for 
accommodation, and what locations may be best for industrial areas or 
recreation.  
 
 
3.4 Managing vulnerabilities to natural hazards  
3.4.1 Vulnerability - Globally  
As detailed in Section 3.2.1.1, development levels shape vulnerability. 
Unplanned or haphazard development can raise human vulnerability to natural 
hazards. A great deal of work has been carried out with regard to defining, 
measuring and reducing vulnerability. The UNDP (2004) report synthesises 
much of this work and focuses attention on long-term strategies to provide lower 
vulnerability. This includes providing good town planning (to make sure that 
people do not live in vulnerable locations), providing awareness raising 
information to institutions and populations, and implementing long-term 
infrastructure approaches to reduce long-term vulnerability. In short, the report 
outlines that Disaster Risk Reduction measures should be mainstreamed into 
development plans and activities. As a related issue to the long-term approaches 
advocated, one of the cross-cutting aspects identified by the UNDP is the issue of 
governance. With stronger governance, it is argued, comes the ability to improve 
both planning and enforcement of town planning initiatives.  
 
At a more sophisticated level, Parfomak (2008) outlines how individual elements 
of an infrastructure or sector may be considered resilient, but as a whole, the 
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system may be vulnerable. An example of this may be where utilities or private 
companies have congregated close by to each other, making them collectively 
vulnerable to disaster. This may be considered applicable to the Samoas, for 
example where a road bridge, adequate for transport infrastructure, also carries 
water pipework, power cables and telecommunications cabling. Each individual 
element may be considered relatively resilient, however as a whole, they may 
represent a high level of risk in the case that the bridge is damaged as a result of 
a natural hazard. Due to this potential congregation or accumulation of collective 
risk, Parfomak argues that the free market, or specific utility managers, 
sometimes require regulation by the Government. This may be made through a 
number of methods of intervention, such as ‘prescriptive siting’, ‘environmental 
regulation’, ‘encouraging geographic dispersion’ and ‘ensuring infrastructure 
survivability’ (Parfomak, 2008, p13-17). Such interventions may be required of 
the government, again reinforcing the need for good governance in terms of 
reducing overall vulnerability to natural hazards.  
 
With regard to infrastructure loss from natural hazards, Freeman and Warner 
(2001, p12) outline that earthquakes create higher housing damage compared to 
other natural events. However flooding has the largest effect on infrastructure, 
with almost half of infrastructure economic losses due to flood damage to roads. 
They also outline that the location of infrastructure close to coastal regions puts 
further risk to infrastructure from flooding causes.  
 
Using the specific example of the Philippines, two papers (Benson, 2009 and 
Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009) outline community and governmental aspects of 
disaster risk management. The Philippines are exposed to many natural hazards, 
including a high number of tropical cyclones, plus earthquakes and volcanoes. 
Despite this repeated exposure to natural hazards and the ensuing set of disasters, 
the Government appears unable to mitigate against future disasters, instead 
focussing on spending its budget on the post-event mop-ups after disasters. This 
tends to divert resources away from other development initiatives such as public 
health and education. As Benson (2009: p14) puts it, “…disasters are persistent, 
annual events, continually gnawing away at development gains in the 
Philippines.” What activities relating to Disaster Risk Reduction do take place 
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tend to be funded and driven by external agencies and are uncoordinated and 
disjointed. As the issue lacks overall leadership or direction, the issues of 
inadequate legislation, lack of strategy and lack of a (feasible/functioning) lead 
agency are unlikely to be addressed in the short term. In addition to this 
inefficiency, the central government and NGO actors were taking different 
approaches to disasters with, post-disaster, the Government tending to restore 
society to ‘normalcy’, (Benson, 2009: p20) whereas NGOs would attempt to 
tackle the root causes of vulnerability, tending to take differing approaches to 
disaster recovery. This is, unfortunately, a good example of how a lack of 
leadership and strategy can lead to an almost perpetual underperformance in 
disaster risk reduction and a continued vulnerability to natural hazard events.  
 
 
3.4.2 Vulnerability - For small island states  
There are a number of aspects in which small island states may be vulnerable. 
Three of these aspects are focussed on here, namely the locations of communities 
and infrastructure on islands, coastal erosion (or sand management) and power 
supply.  
 
3.4.2.1 Locations of communities and infrastructure 
Why are small island states particularly vulnerable to natural hazards? ECLA 
(2000) explore a number of ways in which small island states are vulnerable in 
general. Factors which cause vulnerability include limited land resource, which 
can severely restrict the amount of land that is available for development, so that 
when populations expand, some live on marginal land or in locations exposed to 
hazards. This lack of land also impacts key functions such as solid waste 
disposal. A good example of this is on Tarawa in Kiribati, where the safe 
disposal of solid waste has become a particular issue. Small islands are often 
very exposed to weather and coastal hazards, particularly wind storms and 
associated rainfall. Furthermore, many small island states have specific natural 
hazards, including volcanic (where the island itself may be the visible section of 
a largely submerged volcano), seismic and exposure to potential tsunami. The 
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above environmental vulnerability factors are echoed by Pelling and Uitto (2001) 
who bring in wider globally evolving vulnerability factors that may increase 
future vulnerability of ‘small island developing states’, including the issues of 
climate change (which cuts across many of the above issues) and urbanisation. 
The terrain and nature of small island states often mean that they suffer from 
limited opportunities for diversification in their economies, which can be weak as 
a result. Finally, and again due to smaller populations, they often suffer from 
weak institutional capacity and have high relative costs of infrastructure per head 
of population. Witter (2004) brings together these concepts, showing that the 
above vulnerabilities, which he categorises into economic, social and 
environmental, interact with and often reinforce each other. In other words, 
environmental vulnerability (including exposure to natural hazards) can have 
knock-on effects to the economic and social spheres and vice versa. Silbert 
(2010) articulates the issue differently, outlining that small islands are limited in 
their options of risk diversion (the opportunity to diversify economic activities) 
and smoothing (small islands may suffer large shocks from natural hazards). 
 
Like ECLA, Douglas (2006) emphasises the relative cost of natural hazards to 
small island states, demonstrating that due to exposure to the range of natural 
hazards, especially regular and repeat hazards such as windstorms, a higher 
proportion of their GDP may be taken up in continuous high hazard management 
programmes. This can make their respective economies weaker and can heighten 
the effects of disaster when it does occur.  
 
A number of texts highlight how a large proportion of island communities are 
located on the coasts of small islands. Mimura (1999) highlights this aspect, 
explaining how ‘high’ islands (for example, the top of a volcano rising from the 
ocean floor) often have rugged topography in the interior of the island, which is 
not suitable for either agriculture or habitation. Flatter land tends to be nearer to 
the coastline. Similarly, fresh groundwater is normally accessible in sandier soils 
near the coastline. Further, livelihoods are mainly located near the coastlines, 
either from land-based agricultural activities or from sea-based fishing or other 
activities. Island communities therefore tend to live near the coast. ‘Low’ islands, 
often atolls, are generally relatively small, and again many livelihoods on ‘low’ 
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islands are closest to the coast, meaning that the respective communities are also 
likely to live there. Mimura goes on to outline that because of the topography and 
the locations of settlements, infrastructure tends to follow around coastlines of 
small islands.  
 
The result of both communities and infrastructure being located near the 
coastline is that both are exposed to coastal (sea-related) hazards. Further, as the 
communities and infrastructure on high islands are normally located at the bases 
of hills, they are further exposed to flooding and landslip hazards from above. 
The above reasons lead specifically to exposure to the following hazard sets:  
 
 
Coastal hazards ‘Base of slope’ hazards Related hazards 
Coastal erosion Flooding  High wind exposure 
Sea-level rise Landslips Saltwater intrusion to 
(fresh) groundwater  
High seas (from storm 
events) 
Artificial dam creation 
and release 
 
Inundation   
Tsunami   
Table 3-2: Small island natural hazards 
 
3.4.2.2 Coastal erosion (sand management)  
Many small island states have a balancing act in regard to sand resources. Sand 
in many such locations is created by biological action on coral reefs, with 
relatively slow replenishment rates. This sand may be captured at the island by 
environmental processes, or may be washed out to deeper water. What sand is 
captured, explains Gillie (1997), can act as a natural buffer zone between the 
wave action of the sea and inland communities and productive land. These sand 
‘buffer zones’ (or beaches) ebb and flow over decades, perhaps being eroded in 
one large storm event, or being added to in another. One issue for small islands is 
that sand is a valuable resource for road and building construction, and this is 
where the balancing act becomes most evident – the sand is a valuable 
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commodity, but provides environmental protection. Some islands have created 
plans for the control of sand resources, which matches Gillie’s recommendation 
that sand removal should be prohibited, in favour of retaining the coastal buffer 
zone that it provides. Osti et al (2009) typify a body of research that outlines that 
mangrove forest at the coastal margin can provide protection against tsunami and 
they advocate for the planting of mangrove trees. Gillie however outlines that it 
is difficult to encourage mangrove growth if the sand is not present long-term as 
the base of the mangrove planting, and such planting can become of marginal 
benefit. In other words, mangroves may grow quickly and provide environmental 
protection to island dwellers, but are only viable where there the topography and 
environment maintain sand in an area anyway, as a ‘foundation’ to the mangrove.  
 
Attempts to control sandy beaches, or to mitigate against wave action, typically 
do not work, as Gillie outlines that groynes and seawalls do not hold sand in one 
place, but merely act as a hard surface against which the sea action creates 
turbulent eddies, which can disperse / remove the sand. On removal of the sand, 
the seawalls, for example, become the hard surface against which the sea acts. 
Such seawalls can become relatively exposed to deeper wave action due to the 
removal of sand and other material which previously supported the beach. Once 
sand is washed away from a seawall, it can in turn become unstable and be 
washed away. In this way, seawalls may hasten the advancement of sea action 
into the interior of an island rather than mitigate against it.  
 
3.4.2.3 Power supply 
Another aspect of infrastructure vulnerability on small islands is power supply. 
Stuart (2006) outlines how most small island states are not located close to large 
continental masses which normally have power-production facilities and 
associated cabling. Small islands therefore have to generate their own power. 
Small islands normally do not have the population bases to support large power-
station construction or operations. The use of fossil fuels for small islands tends 
to be expensive, and it can be environmentally risky, as it must be shipped in, 
and the transfer of fuel from ship to shore can be fraught with difficulties. In 
addition to these factors, it is risky from a power-supply perspective to have only 
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one generator per island, as these normally have no redundancy in case of 
damage or maintenance routines. Despite all of these difficulties, and in contrast, 
small island states often have access to an abundance of natural energy sources 
(wind, solar and wave power). However these are, at the time of writing, 
relatively new technologies, and relatively unreliable or expensive in terms of 
essential energy sources. Stuart suggests that the policy makers and infrastructure 
owners on many small islands tend to act conservatively, leading to slower 
adoption of alternative energy sources. There appears to be great scope for 
moving from single large fossil fuel power station generation to the more 
adaptable generation of power from sustainable sources from multiple sources 
(wind, sun, waves).  
 
As can be seen from the above, small island states often are relatively more 
exposed to natural hazards, particularly coastal ones. They face additional 
difficulties of limited natural resources such as sand and have quandaries in 
producing power. Of highest concern however is the exposure of communities 
and infrastructure to both sea-action, flooding and landslips. All of these hazards 
can additionally have severe implications for freshwater supply, due to potential 
salination of fresh water held in sand layers. For more details on this issue, see 
section 3.4.3.1.  
 
3.4.2.4 Small island state vulnerability overview  
As can be seen from the above, in modern times, for good reason during non-
emergency times, small island populations and infrastructure tend to be located 
near the coast. Whilst this makes good sense economically during non-
emergency times, this does put the population at risk during coastal hazard 
events. The communities involved therefore have a choice of moving inland, 
away from coastal hazards, or taking long-term chances with storm events.  
 
Power supply in small island states has been seen to be problematic using 
imported fossil fuels, but the initial cost of changing to sustainable but 
potentially irregular wind or solar power sources may make such changes 
35 
challenging, particularly to small power supply organisations that may employ 
just a few staff.  
 
In addition to the above coastal and power supply issues, sudden events, such as 
hazard events may make disproportionately high shocks to small island 
economies, as seen in the high % of GDP events noted in section 1.3. Recovery 
from such hazard events can therefore be particularly challenging from small 
island states.  
 
 
3.4.3 Vulnerability - in the Pacific  
3.4.3.1 Pacific natural hazards 
As was seen in Section 1.3, in terms of the number of disasters in the Pacific, the 
vast majority (76%) are caused by windstorms, producing a similar level (73%) 
of the population affected by disasters, and causing 90% of the reported disaster-
related economic losses between 1950 and 2004. Cumulatively, weather events 
including windstorms, droughts and floods accounted for 85% of disasters, and 
93% of economic losses. With the frequency and intensity of weather events set 
to rise through the effects of climate change, it is clear why the majority of effort 
in disaster risk reduction in the Pacific is focussed on weather events. Although 
events such as the Samoan tsunami in 2009 receive a very high profile in the 
media, such events are relatively uncommon and affect a smaller population 
overall compared to weather events.  
 
Bettencourt et al (2006) note that the likelihood of weather events affecting 
countries within the Pacific is therefore high, and as some of the effects of the 
weather events can be mitigated against, it is worth preparing for the events 
before they happen. This aspect will also be expanded upon in Section 3.5.2 
regarding the economic viability of preparing for disaster events.  
 
Although much of the above relates to direct damage from disasters, Pacific 
Islands face additional challenges in that freshwater resources are commonly 
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restricted and are vulnerable to saltwater intrusion, an aspect captured by Mirti 
and Davies (2005). Freshwater is lighter (less dense) than seawater, and therefore 
‘floats’ above saltwater, particularly in sand or in sandy soils, as is the case in 
many Pacific Islands. If an island is overtopped by waves, the saltwater can soak 
into the sand and salinate the freshwater held in the sand. Such an event would 
potentially have high consequences for a small community on a remote low-lying 
island without other viable freshwater sources. With a series of smaller or 
moderate events, groundwater supplies can be gradually salinated and become 
unfit for consumption. With present technologies, de-salinating water is a very 
expensive and energy-intensive process. This salination of fresh water supplies is 
one reason why sea-level rise is focussed upon particularly in discussions on 
climate change in the Pacific.  
 
In relation to disasters facing Pacific Islands, a further distinction made by Mirti 
and Davies (2005) is between ‘high’ Pacific Islands which are typically rocky 
remnants of volcanoes (Fiji, Samoa) or the results of tectonic activity (Papua 
New Guinea, New Caledonia), against the ‘low’ islands typified by coral atolls 
(Tokelau, Kiribati). The nature of disasters will be specific to the location and 
nature of the islands concerned. Clearly, landslips are more likely to be restricted 
to the ‘high’ islands, effects of seawater over-topping islands is more likely to 
affect the ‘low’ islands. Despite this, and as seen in Section 3.4.2.1, the 
freshwater supplies of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ islands may be affected by saltwater 
intrusion.  
 
3.4.3.2 Pacific community and infrastructure vulnerability 
Regarding Pacific Island community vulnerability, there are two main sets of 
texts relating on the one hand to the technical understanding and treatment of 
natural hazards and on the other hand to community coping mechanisms in the 
face of disasters.  
 
Regarding the technical understanding and treatment of hazards, two studies that 
are now, in relative terms, dated due to the continually evolving understanding of 
climate change and climate variability are those from Primo (1997) and Nunn 
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(1997). Primo focuses her attention on the likely effects of sea level rise on the 
island of Kosrae in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). In tune with many 
articles of the era on the identification of the possibility of climate change, but 
with limited proof of its effects, she outlines that there may be some ‘no regrets’ 
actions that may be taken to mitigate against sea level rise. However she believed 
more information was required, particularly relating to coastal zone management. 
She also highlighted that to carry out studies on this subject, there was (in 1997) 
a lack of engineering expertise in-country, and that any research would have to 
be carried out by external consultants. One issue highlighted however was the 
need to engage with local community structures in order to deliver appropriately 
directed strategies or improvements. Nunn (1997) makes note of sea-level rise 
issues in Samoa, noting that by 1997 the Government of Samoa had already 
moved one road inland ‘several kilometres’ in order to avoid coastal erosion 
risks. He also noted that, as in the FSM, it is essential to integrate with local 
community structures and governance in order to deliver strategies and 
implement changes or improvements.  
 
In 2005, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) produced case-studies focussing 
on adaptation to climate change in the Pacific. The case studies were from the 
FSM and the Cook Islands, and included one example from each small island 
state on how adaptation to climate could be managed. The case study from the 
FSM outlined in detail how a roading project in one ‘high’ island was planned to 
be carried out. Two designs for the road were delivered, one based on historic 
weather (specifically rain) patterns, and one on projections of future weather 
patterns based on predicted climate change. The case study demonstrated that 
there would be an ‘incremental cost’ to climate-proofing (allowing for the 
increased rainfalls predicted) the design of the road. It was further demonstrated 
that as the incremental cost was relatively low, there was a high economic benefit 
to spending the additional (incremental) budget to climate-proof the road. At the 
time of writing the case study, the Government of the FSM were planning to 
apply for funding from development institutions for the incremental funding. The 
tone of the case study suggested that, at the time, there were international 
funding mechanisms available that would probably match the incremental 
funding needs of this infrastructure project.  
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In contrast, other articles relate to the vulnerability of the local Pacific 
populations. Lewis (2009) outlines three kinds of Pacific community 
vulnerability: indigenous (primarily from natural hazards), exogenous (primarily 
from outside human activities such as colonial actions or violent conduct) and 
derivative vulnerability (created one at a time, affecting future vulnerabilities, 
such as deforestation of an area or building a runway over agricultural land). 
Lewis suggests that local populations can have resilience to indigenous hazards, 
but limited resilience to exogenous hazards. He further outlines that since 
colonial rule, the self-help activities of local communities has been replaced by a 
dependence on external assistance. The increasing reliance on external assistance 
at the expense of community system resilience is strongly supported by 
Campbell (2010) who outlines some of the mechanisms through which Pacific 
Island communities historically ensured their own resilience. Such mechanisms 
included living on higher ground, constructing resilient buildings (dependant on 
the specific island and perceived hazard) and choice of crops (favouring resilient 
but low yield compared to vulnerable high-yield crops). As the colonial powers 
moved in, the various communities came to rely on colonial relief in times of 
emergency, and local systems were comparatively lost. This process became 
most established after 1945 but prior to political independence of the islands 
(broadly, from the 1960s to the 1980s). Since the 1980s, responses by the 
international community to disasters in the Pacific have been patchy, leading in 
some countries to a greater focus on local planning and resilience efforts. In this 
way, Pacific communities are becoming more exposed to natural hazards as they 
have progressively lost their natural resilience to those hazards. Formerly 
resilient communities have therefore become vulnerable communities. 
 
In a separate paper, Campbell (2009) gives further detail on factors of local 
community resilience to natural hazards. He outlines three aspects of resilient 
Pacific communities, namely food security, cooperation and settlement factors. 
Some aspects of resilient behaviour traditionally may have been directed at 
natural hazards, whilst other in-built resilience to natural hazards may in fact 
have been delivered for reasons that had nothing to do with natural hazards, but 
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happened to provide resilience. Through local systems, communities built up a 
variety of means of providing resilience to natural hazards.   
 
One common thread from the texts of Lewis (2009), Campbell (2009) and Primo 
(1997) is that communities, despite some losses, retain knowledge on natural 
hazards in their home locations. Communities are able to comment, normally 
with authority, on their understandings of natural hazards.  
 
Specifically regarding Samoa and American Samoa, these island groups are, in 
many ways, geographically similar. Both sets of islands are located in a similar 
area of the South Pacific and are both exposed to similar weather and sea-related 
hazards. Both sets of islands are ‘high’ islands, founded on volcanoes rising from 
the ocean floor. Hazards are seen to be volcanic, seismic, weather related (high 
winds, high rainfall with the associated potential for flooding and landslips) and 
sea related (including high seas and tsunami). Both island states are subject to the 
vulnerability factors outlined in the sections above, particularly those relating to 
small island states and Pacific Islands. These hazards will be highlighted in more 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5 below, relating to the specific island nations.  
 
3.5 Planning for natural hazards  
3.5.1 Long-term planning against natural hazards  
As seen in Section 3.3.1, there is a global recognition that long-term planning for 
long-term community outcomes, such as planning the locations of settlements 
and infrastructure need to take natural hazards into account. As will be seen in 
Section 3.5.2, this approach appears economically sound. There are two strands 
of thought specific to the effects of natural hazards on infrastructure that are 
worth considering, as follows.  
 
Firstly, Transit New Zealand’s (now the New Zealand Transport Agency) 
approach to the management of its State Highway roading network in regard to 
climate change issues is worth noting. Kinsella and McGuire (2005) outline how 
the effects of climate change are slowly developing, and although there is 
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increasing certainty about its effects, there is still not enough information to 
provide good evidence as to how road pavement construction should be 
designed. The authors suggest that the design of road pavements should, in the 
case of New Zealand, remain as it was at the time of writing, with design updates 
provided at cycles of replacement of pavements. Pavements in New Zealand 
have design lives of between 13-18 years for chipseal, and 15-20 years for 
asphalt pavements. The logic given is that it was not worth changing pavement 
designs on assets with such ‘short’ design lives with climate change probably 
taking longer than this to more clearly manifest itself. On the other hand, 
Kinsella and McGuire note that roading structures (bridges) are higher-cost items 
normally with 100-year design-lives, with many crossing water courses. The 
authors demonstrate that with such valuable assets at risk, it is worth retrofitting 
structures against the effects of extreme flooding events. This approach is given 
as an example of best-practice by Rayner (2010). In this way, it can be seen that 
climate change adaptation approaches can be taken for existing infrastructure, 
depending on the nature of the asset and the hazard faced by it.  
 
On another strand of thought, Hosseini et al (2009) bring forward the need for 
considering not just the long-term vulnerability of infrastructure, but also the 
consideration of emergency needs, immediately post-event, for example, the 
need for robust buildings for ‘Emergency Operations Centres’, the need for local 
hospitals to cater for potentially isolated communities and for emergency 
evacuation buildings or locations. Additionally, there is a need to ensure that 
emergency access be maintained between communities, wherever possible, to 
allow emergency relief to access areas that require assistance. Such planning can 
best be carried out through the involvement of emergency management staff and 
communities during the design process of infrastructure. In this way, immediate 
post-event emergency needs can be better catered for.  
 
3.5.2 Economic analysis (cost/benefit measures) and prioritising 
projects 
Apart from the human resilience aspects of designing infrastructure to be 
resilient to natural hazards, there can also be clear economic benefits. Yumul et 
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al (2011) outline the stance taken by the government in the Philippines, where 
disaster management efforts have, in recent times, been focussed on post-disaster 
recovery efforts. Such work can be costly and does not mitigate against the loss 
of human life. The authors argue that this is not a sustainable or efficient 
approach to take, and that budget would be better spent on long-term risk-
reduction efforts.  
 
Bloomstein (1999) provides a methodology for calculating the cost of natural 
disasters. Direct costs of disaster are relatively easily identified and costed – such 
as impacts on roads and buildings. What is often not well captured in working 
out the secondary effects – economic loss of productivity of populations 
recovering from the effects of disaster rather than continuing economic activity. 
Further, Bloomstein (1990: p1) outlines how secondary disasters may occur: 
“high windstorms are followed by floods and landslides, floods by drought and 
drought by pest epidemics and famines.” These follow-on effects are often not 
adequately accounted for in calculating the economic effects of disasters. 
Through such under-counting, it is possible that the true costs of disasters are 
often under-quantified in economic terms.  
 
A number of texts, typified by a UNDP paper, outline that public investment 
should be subjected to cost benefit analysis “to enhance its sustainability and 
cost-effectiveness, and contribute significantly to the reduction of disaster risk” 
UNDP (2009, p177). Cost benefit analysis is a method of calculating the 
economic productivity of a specific intervention or project. It is calculated by 
dividing the future benefit of a project by its cost. A project that has exactly 
equal benefit to cost would have a ratio of one. A project that produced double 
the social benefit compared to its cost (and therefore would appear to be a good 
investment) would have a cost benefit ratio of two. By calculating the cost 
benefit ratios of projects, two outcomes are achieved. Firstly, an indication is 
gained as to whether a project is worth implementing, and secondly, cost benefit 
ratios can act as a ranking-system for potential future projects. The projects with 
the highest ratio are those most worth implementing, and therefore could be 
carried out first. Those with lower ratios are likely to be carried out subsequently, 
or not at all. It should be noted that, for example, the New Zealand Transport 
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Agency normally only considers implementing projects having a cost benefit 
ratio of four or above. Cost benefit ratios for infrastructure are often calculated 
by engineers as they are normally best placed to calculate the costs of a project, 
and often have guidelines for calculating the benefits of a project. This method 
can appear to be an impartial and fair system of prioritising future potential 
projects. The effect of different discount rates on cost benefit calculations may be 
seen in Section 7.5.1.  
 
Relating to the Pacific Islands specifically, it should be noted that an out-of-
session paper titled “Economic Costs of Natural Disasters in the Pacific Islands 
Region and Measures to Address Them” was compiled by SOPAC for the 2009 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (SOPAC, 2009). This paper outlined the 
economic advantage, as calculated from cost benefit ratios, of taking disaster risk 
reduction into account in future works. Due to this demonstrated advantage, the 
paper therefore advocated the mainstreaming of disaster management into 
government decision processes. Of note here is therefore that at Minister level, 
the economic benefit of carrying out disaster risk reduction initiatives, and of 
mainstreaming disaster management in development decisions, has been 
highlighted to the governments of Pacific Island states.  
 
The use of cost benefit analysis should, however, come with a degree of caution. 
Firstly, and as noted above, there can be persistent under-counting of both costs 
and benefits: undercounting of secondary costs of disasters, as noted above, and 
therefore undercounting of the potential benefits from projects that mitigate 
against disaster. Secondly, Mechler (2003) outlines that cost benefit ratios should 
not be the only criteria for working out whether a project is economically viable, 
as the analysis of risk is a key element of the calculation that should be 
particularly assessed. By calculating the average values of risks (the expected 
return period of a major seismic event in Wellington is, say, 200 years), with the 
cost of such a disaster spread over many years, the extreme consequence of such 
disaster may not be taken into account by governments when planning 
infrastructure, who should take a risk-averse stance. Mechler puts forward 
specific analysis of an event in Honduras and the USA where, in taking into 
account the high risks faced with certain hazards, better planning for disasters 
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was achieved. A third issue with the use of cost benefit ratios for prioritising 
potential future projects is that as a tool it is well understood by engineers who 
are versed in calculating economic outcomes from projects, but less well 
understood by social scientists. Therefore, whilst costs of social projects may be 
easily calculated (staff costs, overheads etc.), the economic benefits of social 
projects can be harder to calculate or prove. Anecdotal evidence, for example 
from the Hutt City Council in New Zealand is that when cost benefit ratios were 
used as the basis of decision making, potential new Council projects put forward 
by the roading department were consistently favoured for funding compared to 
Council social-based projects, the benefits of which were harder to quantify. This 
means that, as a tool, by simply using cost benefit analysis for ranking the 
effectiveness of potential projects, unequal decisions may be taken for 
development outcomes.  
 
Other means of prioritising potential future projects include various points-
scoring/ranking approaches, typified by the system adopted by the Ohio, 
Kentucky and Indiana Council of Governments (FHWA, 2003). This system 
assigned scores to various aspects of potential projects, such as safety and 
community issues. It was found in this case that the use of such a tool was 
subjective, and led to inter-organisational disputes about the relative rankings for 
projects. In this case, the Council of Governments opted after some time to use 
cost benefit ratio prioritisation methods instead. As will be seen in the case of 
Samoa, ‘multi criteria assessment tools’ are a more formalised points-scoring 
approach that can also be taken to rank potential projects. Such assessment tools 
often use benefit cost ratios as one aspect of the decision making process.  
 
3.6 Summarising best practice  
From the above literature, some elements of best practice approach are evident. 
These can be summarised into three broad categories: the analysis of natural 
hazards; community involvement; and government investment and coordination.  
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The analysis of natural hazards  
 
Analyse infrastructure according to the specific hazard it faces. Each type of 
infrastructure (e.g. roads, power cabling) faces different hazards in different 
locations. Detailed analysis should be taken of each element in each location for 
a full picture of infrastructure vulnerability.  
 
Take into account evolving hazards (climate change/urbanisation) in the design 
of infrastructure. Any hazard analysis should take into account not just present 
hazards, but evolving ones too, as the design-life of infrastructure will span the 
effects of future changes.  
 
Represent hazards to infrastructure in clear and intuitive ways. Once hazards 
have been assessed, it is best practice to map them in a simple way that people in 
the community can intuitively understand.  
 
 
Community involvement  
 
Community involvement is needed in decision making, including both disaster 
risk reduction and planning the post-disaster management. The community, when 
presented with a simple and intuitive mapping of hazards, can comment on their 
understanding of the hazard (triangulating the final assessment of the hazard) and 
make comment on their understanding of how best to treat the hazard. Local 
knowledge, often accumulated over decades, often demonstrates at least elements 
of best-practice for a specific location.  
 
 
Government investment and coordination   
 
Overall coordination of disaster risk management, including both pre-event 
disaster risk reduction, and post-event disaster management is necessary. 
Although the community will be often be best able to define its post-disaster 
response, the local government still retains the function of implementing a 
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response and recovery effort. Coordination of the two aspects of disaster risk 
management may then be provided by a holistic approach, and can be considered 
best practice.  
 
Plan development of the long-term. Mainstreaming disaster risk management in 
planning development allows the potential for disasters to be taken into account 
across the spectrum of development activities, and can aid in ‘disaster-proofing’ 
future development gains.  
 
The ‘free market’ cannot always decide optimal locations for infrastructure in 
terms of overall system resilience. The Government has to take an over-riding 
assessment of cumulative risk, and not simply assume that the private sector, or 
where relevant separate government departments, will provide overall resilient 
systems. Government retains an overview role in ensuring that the overall 
resilience of a community or area is attained.  
 
Using cost benefit ratios in prioritising implementation. Cost benefit ratios 
provide a robust method of assessing and prioritising interventions, and their use 
is considered best practice. Caution should be taken however not to base all 
decisions purely on cost benefit ratios, as risk patterns and other community 
factors such as the protection of key cultural sites must also be considered in 
planning the resilience of future infrastructure. Further, cost benefit ratios often 
under-estimate the benefits of social-type projects.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusions of the literature review    
From the above literature review, ‘best practice’ regarding policies for resilient 
infrastructure have been identified. Looking forward, it will be possible to 
compare the respective policies of Samoa and American Samoa against these 
best practices. The best practices have demonstrated that hazard mappings must 
be produced that can be understood intuitively by non-technical people. This 
allows for politicians and communities to understand the realistic hazard risks 
they are facing, which allows for potential future investments to be assessed, and 
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allows for realistic planning for potential emergency events. Political and 
community involvement in understanding the risk, planning new infrastructure 
and planning emergency responses when hazard events occur has been seen to be 
very important in obtaining ‘buy-in’ to how to deal with hazard risks. This 
political and community involvement will, in some contexts, advocate for 
government investment and coordination in reducing natural hazard risks. 
Indeed, central governments should be taking a lead in commencing work on 
resilient infrastructure policies, taking into account the existing knowledge and 
needs of their populations, as seen above. Disaster risk management needs to be 
included (mainstreamed) in overall policy decisions, to ensure that policies and 
projects are not, in fact, making populations more vulnerable to natural hazards 
rather than less-so. Some tools, such as the use of cost-benefit analyses may 
assist governments in assessing impartially the relative benefits of different 
projects, allowing investment to be channelled efficiently to appropriate projects.  
 
The specific cases of Samoa and American Samoa may now be assessed against 
the above identified best practices.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: INFRASTRUCTURE 
RESILIENCE POLICY APPROACHES IN SAMOA  
 
The following chapter overviews Samoa’s approaches to resilient infrastructure 
policies, ending with a comparison between Samoa’s approaches and ‘best 
practice’ as outlined in Section 3.6 above.  
  
4.1 Past approaches affecting infrastructure (investment / 
mitigation)   
Unfortunately, due to a Samoan Government re-organisation in the 1980s, 
records on past decisions relating to infrastructure are now hard to locate. 
Regarding the approaches taken to infrastructure design and construction in the 
past, it appears that infrastructure in Samoa was constructed to standards 
appropriate to the time and context. Due to changing weather patterns, markedly 
changed traffic volumes and weight on roads, and increased populations, some of 
the infrastructure may no longer be thought to be either adequate for ‘normal’ 
supply, or resilient by modern standards. This is a situation that is not unique to 
Samoa or Pacific islands generally. Changing weather patterns, changes of land 
use and changing construction materials and techniques mean that much 
infrastructure around the world is similarly less resilient to natural hazards than 
more recently built infrastructure. A good example of this would be road bridges 
over rivers. Changing land-use upstream of rivers, combined with changing 
weather patterns leads to changing – often higher, or quicker and sharper – river 
flows following a rainfall event. These changes may cause scour (removal of the 
river bed) around bridge foundations, or may even lead to the river changing 
course altogether and diverting around a bridge, damaging the road either side of 
the bridge. Modern design standards are increasingly taking into account the 
effects of changed land-use and of the anticipation of shorter, but heavier, rainfall 
events on bridges and infrastructure generally, and taking into account the 
quicker run-off of rainwater from concrete or other hard surfaces. For the above 
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reasons, it would not be a surprise that some of Samoa’s infrastructure would 
now be vulnerable.  
 
4.2 How are infrastructure vulnerabilities assessed in Samoa?   
In January 2001, the Samoan Government, in the form of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (MNRE) initiated the Coastal Infrastructure 
Management (CIM) Project: CIM Strategy (CIM) (MNRE, 2001). This strategy 
was prepared for the MNRE by Beca International Consultants Ltd (Beca), based 
in New Zealand. The CIM plan identified, for the Samoan context that resilience 
is “to be Adaptive, Responsive and Quick to Recover…” (page 5). Further, the 
strategy outlined key approaches for the delivery of the strategy, namely 
‘National Principles for Management’ and ‘Local Principles for Management’, 
with the sub-heading “An Ethic of Partnership”. This was a key step that has 
strongly influenced the following nature of the CIM Project. As explained by 
Keith Frentz of Beca (telephone conversation, 20 May 2011), the political 
structure of Samoa is very traditional, with strong village (community) 
involvement in decision making. Additionally, around 85% of Samoa is 
community (village) owned, therefore the majority of decisions regarding local 
infrastructure would have to be channelled through local village community 
structures. The CIM Strategy further outlined that the infrastructure plan should 
have the following flow of actions (MNRE, 2001, p5):   
 
 
 
National Principles for Management 
 
 
 
Local Principles for Management 
 
 
An Ethic of Partnership  
 
Information, Evaluation and Monitoring 
 
Education and Awareness 
 
Management and Use of Land and 
Resources 
 
Intervention Actions 
Tools and Actions 
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Subsequent to the adoption of the above strategy, the MNRE procured Beca to 
produce Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. Beca, in conjunction with 
MNRE staff, then contemplated how best to interact with the local village 
communities on gathering information on infrastructure. With the strategy 
identifying “Local Principles for Management” a Beca cross-disciplinary team 
experienced in planning, infrastructure and Pacific issues identified that, as part 
of the means of delivering the project, it was clear that local village community 
structures would have to be involved in the hazard identification and planning 
process (Michele Daly, personal communication, 3 May 2011). Samoa as a 
whole has over 40 districts. It was decided by the combined MNRE and Beca 
project team that each district would have to be consulted. The MNRE and Beca 
then proceeded to engage with every village in Samoa to produce their own 
Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans.  
 
For community engagement on the above plans, it was noted by the project team 
that the matai (traditional chiefly leaders) within the Samoan village structures 
were predominately (around 95%) male (Keith Frentz, Beca, personal 
communication, 20 May 2011). In order to be more inclusive, the community 
engagement was extended to allow the participation of women and ‘untitled’ 
men in discussions.  
 
Thus, representatives of the MNRE and Beca, spent around a week with each of 
the districts in Samoa, creating the Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. In 
the first tranche, 15 districts were covered during the 2001 to 2003 period, with 
the remaining 27/28  covered between 2006 and 2008. During the consultations, 
the villagers were shown preliminary hazard mappings of their villages, as 
prepared by Beca staff. The villagers discussed these natural hazards, and the 
effects that they may have had on their district in the past. The potential effects 
of hazards were then considered on the various items of infrastructure in the 
village, including roads, water and power supply, and on key buildings such as 
schools and hospitals. The term infrastructure was also widened, in this case, to 
include culturally significant features such as cemeteries and churches. Further, 
potential projects for upgrading infrastructure were identified, but at that stage, 
not in any prioritised structure. The output of the village plans were collated into 
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District Plans. The resulting District Plans were then signed by the village heads, 
by the Chief Executive Officer of the MNRE, and by the Minister for the Natural 
Resources and Environment. Each of these District Plans were published for 
public viewing (MNRE, 2012). With both Central Government and Village 
input, the final District Plans were therefore an agreed view of the resilience (or 
vulnerability) of the infrastructure in the village at that time. 
 
Having completed the above sets of plans, and therefore having an overview of 
the natural hazards, and infrastructure vulnerability facing them, the community 
also produced ‘pre-plans’ for action in the case that a natural hazard event took 
place. This could mean collection of the community at a safe location during a 
storm event, for example. This consulting process both educated the community 
in what hazards existed and raised their knowledge regarding what actions 
should be taken in case of an event. In this way, the resilience of both the 
physical infrastructure was potentially to be raised, but at least as importantly, 
the community resilience itself was improved.  
 
Through the above process, the resilience of the infrastructure in Samoa was 
mapped. It identified a total of around 2,000 potential projects (Michele Daly, 
personal correspondence, 3 May 2011) around the country that could be 
performed to raise the resilience of infrastructure. As part of this collation of 
projects, the MNRE took into account factors such as the provision of ‘loop’ 
networks around the islands (as opposed to simple single-strand networks, for 
example in power or road networks) and other resilience factors.  
 
Subsequent to the above process, the MNRE performed an additional task. It 
provided broad costings and Benefit Cost Ratios for projects and prioritised them 
through the use of a multi-criteria decision tool (Beca, 2010). This decision tool 
scored various aspects of projects under three categories – 
‘vulnerability/seriousness’ (including the factors of culture, equity and co-
benefits), ‘manageability’ (including the factors of land tenure, sequencing and 
project feasibility) and ‘urgency’. Once overall scores were totalled for 
individual projects, a ranking of the various potential projects was produced.  
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The scale of the above task should not be underestimated. Through the above 
work, both Central Government and communities came to an agreed outcome on 
resilience, raised community awareness of natural hazards and created pre-plans 
for action in the case of hazard events. The subsequent prioritised list of potential 
infrastructure upgrade projects can therefore be seen to have been consulted 
upon, and is a work of relative robustness.  
 
 
4.3 Vulnerability issues identified  
Through the process outlined in Section 4.2 above, a number of broad 
vulnerability classes of infrastructure vulnerability were identified. These 
included the following”:   
 
Road access  
It was identified that a large number of roads are potentially vulnerable to sea 
action, for example, from being washed out by storm events. As a result, it has 
been proposed that a number of roads be moved inland, away from the coast, in 
some cases quite significantly. It is understood that if this were to happen, other 
infrastructure types may follow – for example if a road is moved, a family home 
may be moved to match, along with the provision of utilities to that home. On a 
larger scale, power cabling could also be moved to align with the road.  
 
Sea walls  
In some cases, there have been recommendations for sea walls to be 
strengthened, constructed or lengthened.  
 
Sand use 
A policy is now being developed by the Samoan Government on the use of sand, 
as it is a relatively limited resource.  
 
Water supply  
The salinity of water supplies is increasing in some locations, an issue that may 
have longer-term infrastructure implications.  
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The above is a snap-shot of the vulnerabilities identified, and provides an 
example of the spread of issues that were identified as part of the Coastal 
Infrastructure Management Plan work.  
 
 
4.4 Approaches by Government – treatment of vulnerabilities 
It appears that the Samoan Government did not greatly take into account 
specifically, as would have historically been common internationally, 
infrastructure resilience, until the adoption of the CIM Strategy in 2001. The 
CIM strategy outlined, in broad terms, the following process:   
 
1. identify hazards.  
2. assess risks.  
3. prioritise.  
4. apply for funding.  
5. implement.  
6. create pre-plans for higher risks.  
 
This full and holistic progression, involving both Central Government and the 
various communities, has led to comprehensive and robust plans. Clearly, the 
Samoan Government is taking infrastructure resilience seriously. This 
demonstrates the ability to plan, and could be seen as an example of ‘good 
governance’, although it should be recognised that only a few physical 
infrastructure projects have, as yet, been completed as a result.  
 
Regarding the institutional framework in which the above work has proceeded, 
as has been seen, the work outlined above has been led and managed by the 
Samoan Government Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. In 
response to the creation of the above strategy, and to the increasing negative 
environmental and community effects of urbanisation, the Planning and Urban 
Management Agency (PUMA) was formed. This agency started with little 
mandate or role, but has since grown in strength, credibility and scope, including 
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the expansion of its scope to rural areas (Keith Frentz, personal communication, 
20 May 2011). For this reason, the management of much of the work outlined in 
Section 4.3 is now carried out by PUMA. One reason for the significant gains 
made by PUMA in the urban areas is that economic growth in Samoa has fuelled 
practices such as urban waste collection from households in Apia. This is partly 
due to the presence of returnees to Samoa from Australia, New Zealand and the 
USA. Apart from one other example of urban environmental advancement cited 
in Kiribati, the progress made in Samoa regarding infrastructure resilience 
understanding, and in solid waste management practices, appears to be almost 
unique within the Pacific Islands (Jones and Lea, 2008).  
 
Through the above, it is apparent that the Samoan Government is taking the issue 
of infrastructure resilience forward. The progress made is not the result of a 
single pocket of Government making gains, rather an appropriately resourced 
Government Department making gains on an issue. In other words, these gains 
are not isolated or ‘random’ successes. The resulting holistic gains also 
demonstrate governmental management success.  
 
 
4.5 Approaches by support governments  
The Samoan Government would be unlikely to be able to fund all infrastructure 
resilience initiatives itself, in isolation, even those attracting a Benefit Cost Ratio 
of more than two. More likely is that it would look for assistance externally in 
funding potential projects. Traditionally, and as seen in Section 1.6, Samoa has 
strong ties with New Zealand. Equally, the New Zealand Government also 
demonstrates why it has strong ties with a number of Pacific nations through its 
existing policies, and as outlined on its website (NZAID, 2010a). This ‘one page’ 
policy statement outlines that “New Zealand has strong connections with many 
Pacific Countries due to constitutional relationships, migration, travel and trade.” 
This strong connection translates to over 50% of New Zealand foreign aid being 
spent in the Pacific region. Clearly, this relationship would be expected, in 
future, to be a factor for both the Samoan and New Zealand governments in the 
assessment of project funding applications. For example, it is anticipated that the 
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New Zealand Government will deliver some NZ$23 million in development 
support to Samoa in the 2011/12 financial year (NZAID, 2012). The Australian 
Government takes a similar approach, with AusAID undertaking to deliver 
Aus$43.7 million to Samoa within the 2011/12 financial year (AusAID, 2012a). 
Part of this funding may include specific funding to the International Climate 
Change Initiative, including assistance to Pacific Island Countries (AusAID, 
2012b).  
 
Regarding policy on the environment and resilient infrastructure on Pacific 
Islands, Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies align very closely with that of 
the Pacific Islands Forum Strategy (NZAID, 2010b). This forum, a collaborative 
grouping of aligned Pacific Islands, including New Zealand, has produced a 
policy on ‘Pacific regional environment and natural disasters’. (Note – the 
‘American Flag’ states, including American Samoa, are not a part of the forum.) 
This policy, and particularly the manner in which it is a collaboration of both 
funding/donor and recipient Pacific Nations, provides a framework within which 
external funding partners, Australia and New Zealand included, can channel 
funds with agreed philosophies for action. These philosophies include the 
requirement for the provision of resilient infrastructure, and reiterates the need 
for steps such as good hazards analysis, public education, planning for effective 
response, the use for early warning systems, and promotes the use of disaster risk 
reduction activities. These steps strongly mirror the World Bank document 
(Bettencourt et al, 2006) that promotes good practice in disaster risk reduction in 
the Pacific.  
 
As can be seen above, there is strong alignment between the recommendations of 
the World Bank, the Australian and New Zealand Governments with the 
planning and actions of the Samoan Government regarding disaster risk 
reduction, relating specifically to planning for more resilient infrastructure.  
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4.6 Samoan potential funding of infrastructure resilience   
International funding applications  
Whilst the Samoan Government, specifically the Planning and Urban 
Management Agency of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 
have produced some cohesive and evidence-based plans, in conjunction with the 
communities involved, relatively little implementation has been carried out, as of 
March 2012. However, as outlined by Keith Frentz of Beca (personal 
communication, 20 May 2009), the Samoan Government, seen as relatively 
stable by external governments, and having carried out the planning outlined 
above, is in a very strong position when applying for funding for infrastructure 
resilience projects. Additionally, with specific ‘climate change’ funding 
potentially available from multilateral finance institutions likely to be available 
in the coming years (see section 6.4), the Samoan Government has already 
carried out the planning necessary. Samoan funding applications are more likely 
to be approved as a result.  
 
Internal funding decisions 
In terms of decisions for funding infrastructure changes and upgrades, and as 
outlined in Section 3.5.2, Benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs) are a recognised means of 
prioritising funds for projects. As seen in Section 4.2, the Samoan Government 
has produced BCRs for a number of potential projects outlined in the Coastal 
Infrastructure Management Plan process. The approach taken in the case of this 
planning is that projects that attract a BCR of 0.8 are subjected to a feasibility 
assessment and an environmental assessment, with a view to further prioritised 
ranking and potential funding and implementation (Michele Daly, personal 
communication, 3 May 2011). It is conversely clear however, that projects with 
BCRs of less than 0.8 are unlikely ever to progress. It should also be noted that 
very low-cost projects with clear benefits, and culturally important projects, such 
as the protection of cemeteries, are not subjected to BCR calculations, and have 
been progressed without having to pass these tests.  
 
Looking beyond the funding of resilient infrastructure in isolation, the Samoan 
Government is also assessing potential projects against ‘village plans’, which 
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include climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, biodiversity, 
renewable energy, natural hazards, emergency and disaster management plans, 
forestry, marine and agricultural developmental projects (ibid). This additional 
testing of projects against multiple alternatives could be expected to produce 
truly robust project prioritisation assessments, and take a wider developmental 
approach to the prioritisation of potential projects.   
 
Regarding very expensive potential infrastructure resilience projects, these tend 
to be carried out by the Government’s service providers, through their annual 
planning processes. For example, the roading authority will assign its own 
priorities for projects, as will the Samoa Water Authority, as will the remaining 
Government agencies (ibid).  
 
Regarding the timing of the implementation of potential projects, the Assistant 
Chief Executive Officer of the Planning and Urban Management Agency 
(PUMA) explained (personal communication, 31 May 2011) that “Timing has 
not been a big feature in the documents, rather more an identification of actions.” 
This was a conscious decision, taken so that projects could be identified at a 
village level without fear of particular projects being dismissed at an early stage 
due to any factor.  
 
Thus, although funding is not presently flowing to many projects, the framework 
and planning are in place for projects to proceed, should the funding be available.  
 
 
4.7 Lessons to be learnt on resilient infrastructure policies –
Samoa 
What lessons can be learnt from the work of the Samoan Government relating to 
infrastructure resilience planning? Referring back to the ‘best practices’ outlined 
in the literature review, section 3.6, the following can be seen:   
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Policy Carried out? Comments 
The analysis of natural hazards  
Analyse infrastructure according to the 
specific hazard it faces  
Yes / best 
practice 
Engineering and 
village consultations 
carried out.  
Take into account evolving hazards 
(climate change/urbanisation) in the 
design of infrastructure  
Yes / best 
practice 
Urbanisation, and 
climate change taken 
into account.  
Represent hazards to infrastructure in 
clear and intuitive ways  
Yes / best 
practice 
Represented in CIMS 
documents.  
Community involvement 
Community involvement is needed in 
decision making, including both 
disaster risk reduction and planning the 
post-disaster management 
Yes / best 
practice 
All communities 
consulted 
Government investment and coordination 
Overall coordination of disaster risk 
management, including both pre-event 
disaster risk reduction, and post-event 
disaster management is necessary 
Yes / best 
practice 
Both at government 
and community levels 
Mainstreaming disaster risk 
management (taking a holistic 
approach) 
 
Yes / best 
practice 
Hazard plans are 
being assessed against 
other village 
development plans.  
The ‘free market’ cannot always decide 
optimal locations for infrastructure in 
terms of overall system resilience  
 
Yes / best 
practice 
The Samoan 
Government has taken 
an overall view of 
funding on 
infrastructure.  
Using Benefit Cost Ratios in 
prioritising implementation 
 
Yes / best 
practice 
Exceptions for low-
cost and culturally 
important items.  
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As can be seen from the above, the Samoan Government’s approach, as 
implemented by the Planning and Urban Management Agency section of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, has achieved ‘best practice’ in 
comparison to the practices identified in the Literature Review (Section 3 of this 
document) effectively against all of the factors identified.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: INFRASTRUCTURE 
RESILIENCE POLICY APPROACHES IN 
AMERICAN SAMOA   
 
The following chapter overviews American Samoa’s approaches to resilient 
infrastructure policies, ending with a comparison between American Samoa’s 
approaches and ‘best practice’ as outlined in Section 3.6 above.  
 
 
5.1 Past approaches affecting infrastructure (investment / 
mitigation)  
The South Pacific Conference, held in American Samoa in 1962, was a major 
impetus for providing ‘modern’ infrastructure to the territory at that time 
(American Samoa Humanities Council, 2009). With planning for the conference 
starting just thirteen months before the conference itself, there was a rush to build 
an airport runway capable of landing jet aircraft, although there was no airport 
terminal at that time, and a 13km road connecting the airport to Pago Pago was 
constructed. Further building work was carried out, including a school building 
which, due to the absence of a hotel at the time of the conference, was used as 
accommodation for 100 of the conference delegates. Although this construction 
work, carried out within a short time-frame, was a great achievement, it should 
be noted that much of it was carried out by external (US mainland based) 
contractors, and did not have a great deal of long-term planning forethought. At 
the time, US Secretary Stewart L. Udall, overseeing the preparations, stated that 
“The truth is that we have not formulated any plans for the future of American 
Samoa… Our goal is to give self-government as quickly as possible. Statehood is 
not the ultimate. We have not worked out any special steps for the future.” (ibid, 
p276). It seems, therefore, that the work carried out for the South Pacific 
Conference was carried out in a ‘bubble’ of thought, without particular reference 
to the long-term needs and requirements of the islands, although it should be 
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acknowledged that the work did provide the airport runway, a link-road and at 
least one school building at the time.  
 
Infrastructure development work did continue after the South Pacific Conference. 
The Governor at the time, Governor H. Rex Lee, developed a plan to provide a 
road to every village in American Samoa within ‘two or three years’ (ibid). This 
was partially achieved, albeit later than the planned timeframe. Some work was 
carried out voluntarily by some of the communities served, where they hand-dug 
some sections of the roads.  
 
Whilst the above provided some basic infrastructure for the island, a hurricane 
struck the territory in 1966. Damage was caused to the hospital and “parts of the 
new road suffered because there was no seawall”. This event “provided the 
impetus to prioritise power generation, completion of the new hospital, and new 
building standards to maximum solidity” (ibid, p287). It appears that the original 
construction, carried out in a rush, suffered from a lack of rigorous planning or of 
thorough design.  
 
Moving forward, in 2001 a workshop was held by the ‘American Flag Pacific 
Islands’ (Hawai’i, Guam, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the US-affiliated Pacific Islands, which include 
the Federated States of Micronesia (Yap, Pohnpei, Kosrae and Chuuk), the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Pulau) on Climate Change 
and Variability (Shea, 2001). Although climate change has the potential to 
greatly affect Pacific Islands through more extreme storm events, and raising sea-
levels, it is interesting that this workshop focussed only on climate-change, rather 
than on the wider subject of resilience to natural hazards. It is also interesting in 
that it was carried out only between the American Flag countries, demonstrating 
and reinforcing that parallel political systems within Polynesia and Micronesia 
meant that there was little apparent interaction between the Australian and New 
Zealand aligned Pacific Islands and the American dependant territories on 
disaster risk management. The outcome of the workshop was the identification of 
seven main aspects of ‘Building Resilience’: provide access to fresh water, 
protect public health, ensure public safety in extreme events and protect 
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community infrastructure, promote wise use of coastal and marine resources, 
sustain tourism and sustain commercial and subsistence agriculture (Shea, 2003).  
 
 
5.2 Approach taken to community and infrastructure 
vulnerability/resilience   
On 1 and 2 February 2011, a summit was held in Pago Pago entitled “Making 
Climate Change Local: Resilient Communities in the Pacific”. Again, the 
seminar was largely (but not exclusively) directed at American Flag Pacific 
Islands. The report on the summit was produced in April 2011 (Doherty, 2011). 
Various working groups on this summit identified climate-change related issues, 
and made suggestions for their mitigation. These included items such as “Issue: 
sand mining. Resolution: Improve education about the negative implications of 
sand mining. Sample project: Enforce regulations and fines.” (ibid, p 12). 
Similarly, the ‘unsustainable infrastructure’ issue included a suggestion that 
“most critical structures [be identified], bringing them to become energy efficient 
and hazard resilient” (ibid p15). In this way, both climate change mitigation 
(reducing carbon emissions) and adaptation (working to reduce the impacts of 
climate change) were addressed.  
 
It should be noted that the above suggestions made do not have actions assigned 
to specific people or organisations, and no timeframes are identified. This was a 
deliberate output of the summit – to produce ideas for action. The US 
Department of Commerce is presently working on a Framework which “should 
contain more concrete plans, and designated agencies who will be tasked with 
many of the recommendations from the Climate Change Summit” (Kristine 
Bucchianeri, personal correspondence, 7 March 2012).  
 
As of June 2011, American Samoa did not have any explicit policies regarding 
infrastructure resilience (Gene Brighouse, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) staff member, personal correspondence, 10 June 2011). 
American Samoa’s resilience work continues to be based on climate change 
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issues, which constitute most, but not all, of the natural hazard risk to the 
territory. No specific work appears to have been carried out regarding the 
resilience of infrastructure, although work has been carried out on climate-
change effects to specific locations, including Fagatele Bay, and work is being 
carried out on the resilience of corals and habitats in the area (ibid).  This 
provides a framework for action, with the hazard mitigation partially addressed 
through climate change issues.  
 
In addition to the above, some pilot studies have been carried out with individual 
communities in American Samoa, specific to identify vulnerability to climate 
change (Emily Gaskin, NOAA Policy Analyst, personal correspondence, June 
2011).  
 
5.3 How vulnerable are American Samoan communities?   
Vulnerability issues identified in the report on American Samoa’s climate change 
summit (Doherty, 2011) can be seen to include:   
 
Sand mining  
It appears that regulations on sand mining exist, as the summit output stated that 
a sample project could be to “enforce regulations and fines”. This demonstrates a 
governmental understanding of the negative impacts of sand removal, although it 
may also appear that any regulation of sand mining has not been as effective as it 
could have been.  
 
Water quality 
It appears that water quality varies throughout the year, as the summit plan 
included a suggestion to “release warnings to the public during periods of water 
quality concern”.  
 
Although mention was made at the above seminar to roading resilience to storms 
and tsunami, it was not apparent whether this was directed at the case of 
American Samoa or at Pacific Islands generally.  
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As can be seen, above, there is some understanding of the perceived vulnerability 
of American Samoan communities to natural hazard events, and actions are 
(March 2012) being formulated to understand more fully what those 
vulnerabilities are.  
 
Whilst the above study presents understanding of the hazards, it appears that the 
American Samoan communities have not been involved in the identification of 
these hazards. This presents a ‘gap’ for the American Samoan community, in that 
whilst the summit held on climate change in American Samoa highlighted 
hazards, a holistic view has not been taken, including other hazards, the 
communities have not become aware of the range of potential hazards, including 
evolving ones, and the community’s emergency planning has not been developed 
from this understanding.  
 
5.4 Approaches by Government.  
The US National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) office and the 
US Department of Commerce are taking the lead in addressing climate change 
issues in American Samoa. Both these organisations have staff ‘off island’ (either 
on the US mainland or on other Pacific Islands, mainly Hawai’i) and American 
Samoa-based staff addressing climate change issues. This provides specialist 
technical advice and management as and when required. Whilst this provides 
targeted advice, it has not been clear to the author of this thesis how these 
departments link in with the American Samoan providers of the infrastructure, 
and what ownership of the issues the infrastructure providers are taking. The 
creation of the framework for actions on climate change outlines specific actions 
for infrastructure providers however, without participation in the decision-
making process leading to the actions, it is possible that actions may not receive 
the attention they require.  
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5.5 Approaches by support Governments  
A staff member at the NOAA stated (Emily Gaskin, NOAA Policy Analyst, 14 
June 2011), “As a US territory, American Samoa is often not eligible for a lot of 
climate project funding directed in the South Pacific Region (such as the PACC 
initiative funded by GEF/UNDP).” This demonstrates that American Samoa is 
more dependent on direct funding from the US mainland, and on satellite 
organisations such as the Pacific Disaster Center, based in Hawai’i. This 
highlights again the relative parallel political structures and thought processes of 
the Australia and New Zealand aligned countries and the US Flag Pacific Islands.  
 
An example of within-American Flag Pacific Island approaches is the work 
carried out by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), an organisation working on 
natural hazards, based in Hawai’i, and aimed primarily at American Flag Pacific 
Island issues. The PDC has worked with ‘a broad range of local agencies’ to 
produce a mitigation plan against natural hazards in American Samoa (Pacific 
Disaster Center, 2011). This mitigation plan maps how various hazards will 
affect American Samoa, although the examples given on the fact-sheet only 
outline the main harbour at Pago Pago. It also outlines how further study is 
required to further understand the hazards faced, and further work is required to 
integrate the information more fully onto a GIS (computer based) system.  
 
As demonstrated above, it can be seen that the US Federal (mainland) system is 
working for the requirements of American Samoa. It can also be seen that there 
appears to be little external assistance to American Samoa beyond what the US 
mainland provides, due to its status as a US territory.  
 
5.6 Lessons to be learnt on resilient infrastructure policies – 
American Samoa  
What lessons can be learnt from the work of the American Samoan 
Administration relating to infrastructure resilience planning? Referring back to 
the ‘best practices’ outlined in Section 3.6, the following can be seen:   
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Policy Carried out? Comments 
The analysis of natural hazards  
Analyse infrastructure according to the 
specific hazard it faces  
Limited Some external and 
Climate Change 
analysis. 
Take into account evolving hazards 
(climate change/urbanisation) in the 
design of infrastructure  
Yes For climate change, at 
government level. 
Represent hazards to infrastructure in 
clear and intuitive ways  
Limited GIS hazard mappings 
only. 
Community involvement 
Community involvement is needed in 
decision making, including both 
disaster risk reduction and planning the 
post-disaster management 
Limited One pilot study 
carried out. 
Government investment and coordination 
Overall coordination of disaster risk 
management, including both pre-event 
disaster risk reduction, and post-event 
disaster management is necessary 
Limited One study carried out, 
limited in scope.  
Mainstreaming disaster risk 
management (taking a holistic 
approach) 
No Climate change issues 
taken in relative 
isolation to other 
factors.  
The ‘free market’ cannot always decide 
optimal locations for infrastructure in 
terms of overall system resilience  
Yes All infrastructure 
actions carried out by 
the administration.  
Using Benefit Cost Ratios in 
prioritising implementation 
No  
 
As can be seen, from the above, the American Samoan Administration’s 
approach has achieved limited progress in many aspects of providing resilient 
infrastructure in comparison to the practices identified in the literature review 
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(Chapter 3). It should be noted that only some community involvement has been 
included, that a holistic approach generally has not been taken and that 
coordination has only been carried out on some specific aspects. In the context of 
Pacific Island states, it is likely that American Samoa is not unique in this 
respect.  
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6 CHAPTER SIX: APPROACHES TAKEN BY 
MULTILATERAL AND OTHER AGENCIES TO 
THE SAMOAS  
Outside the governmental structures of Samoa and American Samoa and their 
supporting countries are the multilateral organisations and International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs). These organisations have the broad aim of raising 
developmental levels and channelling funds to developing countries. As such, in 
their choices of where to direct efforts and funds, they have the power to exert 
pressure to adopt policies or approaches. They can therefore have a great deal of 
influence in the realm of high-cost policies, particularly on issues regarding 
infrastructure. As such, it is worth outlining their potential influence on Samoa 
and American Samoa in terms of resilient infrastructure.  
 
This section will therefore outline the policies taken by these organisations, 
demonstrating the influence of their outputs on infrastructure policies taken in 
the Samoas.  
 
6.1 World Bank   
The World Bank is a partner of the Global Environment Facility (see Section 
6.4). In 2006, the World Bank produced a ‘policy note’, which comprised around 
50 pages (in pamphlet style) of guidance on best practice for disaster risk 
management for Pacific nations (Bettencourt et al, 2006). The framework is 
broken down into six themes, namely:   
 
Theme 1 –  Governance – Organisational, Institutional, Policy and Decision-
making Frameworks.  
Theme 2 –  Knowledge, Information, Public Awareness and Education.  
Theme 3 –  Analysis and Evaluation of Hazards, Vulnerabilities and Elements 
at Risk.  
Theme 4 –  Planning for effective Preparedness, Response and Recovery.  
68 
Theme 5 –  Effective, Integrated and People-Focussed Early Warning 
Systems.  
Theme 6 –  Reduction of Underlying Risk Factors.  
 
The above is holistic, and provides for disaster risk reduction initiatives through 
both community involvement and through physical works on infrastructure. 
Importantly, it outlines the flow of logic of hazard analysis informing 
infrastructure vulnerability, which informs both infrastructure planning processes 
and community emergency planning. It therefore takes a similar approach to that 
outlined at the end of the literature review in Section 3.6. The above World Bank 
policy note is referenced in this thesis in sections 3.4.3.1 and 4.5. The policy note 
is relatively prescriptive in terms of actions that governments may take in 
improving community and infrastructure resilience, and therefore may be taken 
by governments as a framework for action.   
 
Whilst the above demonstrates the World Bank has produced a framework for 
action on resilience, Roberts, Wright and O’Neill (Roberts, 2005) suggest that 
‘major external institutions’ (by which they imply the World Bank and other 
IFIs) advocate a policy to “diminish public sectors”. In other words, Roberts et al 
indicate that IFIs advocate for ‘small’ governmental sectors, allowing market 
forces to dictate investment streams. The intent of the above World Bank policy 
note is to provide a framework for governmental action, which could appear to 
be at odds with the aim of minimising the size and influence of local 
governments. Roberts et al would probably argue that this would produce a 
tension between the World Bank’s advocacy for small government and the 
framework of action outlined in the policy note.  
 
6.2 Asian Development Bank  
The ADB is a partner of the Global Environment Facility (see Section 6.4). The 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has, within its area of scope, both mainland 
Asian countries and the Pacific Islands. It acts as both finance organisation (IFI) 
and provider of technical expertise. One document that demonstrates this 
technical expertise is the document in the ‘Pacific Studies Series’ – ‘Climate 
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Proofing: A Risk-based Approach to Adaptation’ (ADB, 2005), some technical 
contents of which are outlined in section 3.5.1. This document demonstrates the 
likely impact of climate change on Pacific Islands and provides a number of 
worked examples of ways in which climate change adaptation can be 
incorporated into the plans of governments. Whilst these examples include how 
to climate-change-proof National Development Strategies and how to anticipate 
health-effects on a population, it is the worked examples of how to deal with 
infrastructure design that are of interest in this thesis.  
 
Two key examples from the above document are given of how to design 
infrastructure with climate change in mind. One example is of a break-water for a 
harbour at Rarotonga. The worked example demonstrates how historical data on 
storms and wave-heights should not be used as examples of potential future 
events, but demonstrates how wave-heights could be calculated for future events. 
Similarly, in a section on a road design for Kosrae in the Federated States of 
Micronesia, a worked example demonstrates how a bridge over one particular 
existing gully in the proposed route of the road would be designed. This design is 
worked through with historical stream flows used, and worked through again 
with the larger stream flows anticipated from climate-change-induced higher 
intensity rainfall events. Further, the costs of the two potential structures are 
calculated. The increase in costs for the structure taking climate change into 
account is called the ‘incremental cost’. By carrying out this set of calculations, 
the designers have not only developed an appropriate design that will probably 
remain resilient for longer than a ‘historically designed’ structure, but also 
demonstrated the ‘cost’ of climate change adaptation in the design of this road. 
This ADB document then sets out how governments may apply for funding from 
specific international funding mechanisms for this incremental cost.  
 
Although the above document is focussed purely on climate change issues, other 
ADB documents have been produced regarding the wider issue of disaster risk 
reduction. In 2008, the ADB also produced an action plan for implementing the 
ADB’s disaster and emergency assistance policy (ADB, 2008). This action plan 
outlines a number of actions, including: the adoption of DRR to country 
partnerships strategy formulation, training initiatives for specific in-country staff, 
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establishment of an informal DRM network within the ADB, collaboration with 
regional partners and the development of a partnership with the World Bank to 
further develop DRR strategies in low-income and moderate-income countries. 
Technical input of the above nature enhances the understanding of designers and 
funders of infrastructure in the Pacific.  
 
6.3 The United Nations Development Programme  
The UNDP is a partner of the Global Environment Facility (see Section 6.4). In 
addition to the work of both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has carried out various 
studies, and provided various strategy documents, focussed not specifically on 
Pacific Islands, but on global risk reduction issues (UNDP, 2004, 2009). These 
documents provide a summary of the wider understanding of the concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience. As such, the technical outputs of the UNDP in the 
above documents support the policy framework developed by the World Bank, as 
outlined in Section 6.1 above.  
 
6.4 The Global Environment Facility  
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a partnership between ten agencies:  
 
 The UN Development Programme (see section 6.3 above) 
 The UN Environment Programme  
 The World Bank (see section 6.1 above)  
 The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation  
 The UN Industrial Development Organisation  
 The African Development Bank  
 The Asian Development Bank (see section 6.2 above)  
 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
 The Inter-American Development Bank  
 The International Fund for Agricultural Development  
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The GEF “serves as a financial mechanism” for a number of conventions, 
including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (Global Environment Facility Website, 2012). It is to this fund that 
World Bank and ADB documents point applications to incremental costs – as 
outlined in Section 6.2, regarding the additional costs for climate-change-
proofing a structure on a potential road in Kosrae. This fund would be one of the 
prime funds to which Samoa would be likely to apply for funds, although as 
outlined in section 5.5 above, it is not a fund that the American Samoan 
administration can apply to, due to its status as a US Flag territory.  
 
It is through the GEF therefore that the above ten organisations, including IFIs 
direct their contributions to adapt to climate change. The organisations therefore 
demonstrate a high level of cooperation in their activities. (See section 6.6 for 
comment on the impact of this cooperation between agencies.)  
 
6.5 Pacific technical institutions  
Within the Pacific, various technical institutions exist which work on, and have 
an understanding of, issues relating to disaster risk management and disaster risk 
reduction. These organisations are the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SOPAC), the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP) and the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC).  
 
6.5.1 Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Applied Geoscience and 
Technology Division  
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Applied Geoscience and Technology 
Division (SOPAC) provides technical input “for improving the livelihoods of 
Pacific communities” (SOPAC, 2012). As an organisation, it has produced a 
number of the documents referenced in this thesis (Bettencourt et al, 2006), 
(Kaly et al. 1999) (creation of a vulnerability index, to measure the vulnerability 
of communities to disasters), Mirti & Davies (2005) (an analysis of drinking 
water quality in Pacific Island countries) and the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (2009) (a document calculating the economic costs of natural 
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disasters in the Pacific Islands region). SOPAC is specifically focussed on 
engineering and technical issues regarding disaster risk reduction in the Pacific 
Islands region. As can also be seen, although its member states include almost all 
of the Pacific Island countries, and Australia, New Zealand and the USA, much 
of its work is with the Australia / New Zealand aligned countries. SOPAC is 
based in Suva, Fiji.  
 
6.5.2 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP)  
The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has a 
very similar membership to SOPAC, but also traditionally carries out much of its 
work with the Australian / New Zealand aligned Pacific countries. Its remit is on 
“the protection and sustainable development of the region’s environment” 
(SPREP, 2012).  
 
Focussed more on environmental issues, SPREP has produced documents which 
may influence disaster risk reduction measures, such as the UN Environment 
Programme document “Pacific Island Mangroves in a Changing Climate and 
Risking Sea” (Gilman et al, 2006). Whilst not specifically an over-arching 
response to climate change or community resilience, such documents do provide 
technical understandings of a number of resilience issues, some of which can 
directly affect the understanding of infrastructure resilience.  
 
6.5.3 Pacific Disaster Center (PDC)  
The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), based in Hawai’i, has a similar vision to that 
of SOPAC, in that it is “an applied science, information and technology center, 
working to reduce disaster risks and impacts to peoples’ lives and property” 
(PDC, 2012). PDC historically tends to work in the American Flag territories. 
Referenced within this document is the work carried out by PDC on a mitigation 
plan for American Samoa (PDC, 2011).  
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PDC works on a number of similar issues to both SOPAC and SPREP, 
specifically in identifying natural hazards, but extends this technical expertise to 
early warning systems for tsunami and storm events, which are conveyed to all 
Pacific Islands through PDC’s website. It should be noted however that PDC’s 
main focus of work is on hazard analysis and mitigation in the American Flag 
countries of the Pacific.  
 
6.6  Summary on the impact of multilateral organisations  
The Global Environment Facility (GEF), as outlined in section 6.4 is a key 
mechanism for delivering funding for climate change adaptation. As an 
organisation that combines financial contributions from its members, it must bear 
in mind the needs of its funders. This is where Pacific States wishing to access 
funding from the GEF need to ensure that they have aligned their policies to 
those of the ADB and the World Bank, two of the organisations within GEF that 
they are most likely to be in contact with for a variety of funding and other 
purposes. This is where the World Bank ‘Not if But When…’ document (2006), 
written for the World Bank by SOPAC, is so highly influential. Without 
accepting the framework for action by the World Bank outlined in that 
document, including governance issues, Pacific states are unlikely to be gaining 
the approval of the World Bank, and are therefore less likely to be able to access 
funding from the GEF. As seen in section 6.1, there is discussion as to whether 
the aims of the World Bank in maintaining ‘small’ government may be at odds 
with the policies outlined in the above framework, recommending various 
actions of Pacific state governments to increase resilience to vulnerability. This is 
where the Pacific states may need to work to the confines of the World Bank 
‘Not if But When…’ framework. It should be recognised however that the above 
framework demonstrates global best-practice in terms of resilience, and therefore 
the Pacific states will often be accepting sound advice, originating from the 
Pacific region (SOPAC) in following the framework.  
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS  
Having understood best-practice for disaster risk reduction in the literature 
review (Section 3) and the work carried out in Samoa (Section 4) and in 
American Samoa (Section 5), we can now analyse what these approaches may 
teach us.  
 
7.1 Vulnerability of the Samoas to natural disasters  
Are Samoa and American Samoa vulnerable to natural disasters? As has been 
seen in the various studies, the results of which are outlined in chapters 4 and 5, 
there are a number of natural hazard vulnerabilities that the Samoan communities 
are exposed to. Both countries are ‘high’ Pacific Islands, with communities 
mainly living near the coast. This puts both sets of communities particularly at 
risk from sea-related hazards. Both sets of communities are also vulnerable to the 
developing risks associated with climate change – from more intense storm 
events, from rising atmospheric temperatures and sea-level rise. Both sets of 
communities have suffered damage from storm events throughout recent history. 
The hazard profiles of the two countries therefore appear, as would be first be 
expected, to be relatively similar. Neither country is subjected to a clearly 
different or more intense hazard than the other, such as heightened volcanic or 
other risk.  
 
Although the natural hazard risks to the respective populations appear to be 
broadly similar, the analysis of the natural hazard risks have been undertaken 
markedly differently in the two countries. Samoa has taken an all-hazards 
approach, highlighting potential hazards from tsunami, storm, earthquake and 
other risks, as well as taking into account the issue of climate change. American 
Samoa has investigated more specifically climate-change related risks, although 
broad hazard analysis mapping to a coarser level of detail has been carried out.  
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7.2 Disaster Risk Reduction work in the Samoas 
As has been seen in Sections 4.7 and 5.6 comparing how Samoa and American 
Samoa have worked against best-practice in identifying and working to mitigate 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, the approach taken by Samoa closely follows best 
practice. Although this is the case, and although a great deal of planning has been 
undertaken, very little physical works have, as yet, been carried out. American 
Samoa has taken, so far, an approach which has achieved results in specific 
sectors or on specific issues, but has not taken a holistic approach to hazard 
mitigation, and like Samoa has not implemented any significant level of physical 
works. Because of Samoa’s progress on the above issues, it is now well placed to 
apply for the funding from mechanisms such as the Global Environment Facility 
(see section 6.4).  
 
Why has Samoa achieved so much more in this regard? Although Samoa and 
American Samoa have had similar geopolitical histories until around 1900, and 
divergent ones since, differences in approach to the issues do not appear to be 
due to any particular strand of geopolitical history. It does appear, however, that 
the approaches to infrastructure resilience taken in Samoa have been significantly 
more holistic in their approach. This may be because key staff in the Samoan 
government department of the Planning and Urban Management Agency 
(PUMA) took a Masters Degree in Resource Management in New Zealand, and 
followed the relatively holistic approach to land planning as detailed in New 
Zealand’s Resource Management Act. Work streams regarding disaster risk 
reduction in American Samoa appear to be more ‘silo-ed’, creating a less holistic 
approach. Additionally, the work carried out in Samoa, prior to the 
implementation of physical works, is also being tested against non-disaster risk 
reduction based projects, in order that the wider developmental needs of 
communities are addressed alongside disaster risk reduction works. In addition to 
the above, the Samoan approach of consulting village communities throughout 
the process is feeding good information into hazard analysis, and is helping the 
community understand their own relative vulnerabilities to natural hazards, 
therefore helping the communities develop their own disaster management plans, 
in case a natural hazard event does take place.  
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Essentially therefore, there appears to be three key differences in the basic 
philosophies of approach taken in the two countries. Samoa is taking a more 
holistic approach. It has, due to starting thought on this issue back in 2001 
(compared to more recent efforts in American Samoa), progressed further on this 
issue (timely action). Finally, in consulting its communities throughout the 
process, Samoa has wide buy-in of activities by its various communities 
(community involvement).  
 
7.3 Approaches to Disaster Risk Management and Disaster Risk 
Reduction  
As seen in section 6.6, the approaches taken by the various multilateral 
organisations appear to be highly aligned, and follow what many would consider 
to be ‘best practice’. The accepted process for analysis and treatment of natural 
hazards, specific to disaster risk reduction for infrastructure, may be summarised 
as follows:   
 
Analysis and treatment of natural hazard risk to infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure owning organisations should go about resilience planning in the 
following way:   
 
1. Carry out vulnerability mapping – demonstrating potentially vulnerable 
items of infrastructure. The results MUST be able to be intuitively 
understood by a non-expert (this mapping can be simply for the physical 
assets). Indeed, community members may hold much useful information 
relating to natural hazards in the area. Hazards to check would depend on 
the area, but could include seismic, volcanic, flood, tsunami, climate 
change adaptation etc.  
 
2. Work out the consequences to the community (or supply chain, or cost 
of loss, whichever is most relevant) of failure of the item (this can be 
77 
broad-brush, but is needed in order to understand the need for any follow-
on actions and their relative priority). Again, this MUST be in intuitive / 
simple to understand language. Once done, for the case of Pacific Islands, 
the hazard mapping and the consequences should be discussed with the 
community. In more technical applications, benefit cost ratios, 
incremental costs of climate change adaptation and political analyses may 
be appropriate.  
 
3. Include, if necessary, upgrade of assets in future Asset Management 
Plans and implement.  
 
4. Where consequences to the community are severe, plan work-arounds to 
mitigate against failure of the item until any upgrades are complete, in 
conjunction with the community potentially affected.  
 
5. Engage with both the community and the local civil defence body, to 
ensure that approaches are understood across communities, and by the 
most likely emergency responders. 
 
The consistency of approach to resilient infrastructure by the above range of 
organisations could indicate ‘group thinking’ (where communities listen so 
intently to each other that they miss ‘obvious’ other factors), or ‘centralised 
thinking’ (where the advice of just a few experts is taken on board by many 
others). It would appear however, that there is a diversity of institutions, 
governmental, international, and independent / consulting organisations that are 
coming to the same conclusions and are communicating similar messages. It 
appears unlikely, from this wide range of texts, that group or centralised thinking 
is apparent in this case. A different conclusion could be that the basis of disaster 
risk reduction to infrastructure, as summarised in the box above, is an accepted 
and rigorous approach to the issue.  
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7.4 Taking learnings out to other contexts  
What can we take lessons from the experiences of the Samoas which may be of 
relevance to other countries and communities? As seen in section 7.2 above, 
Samoa’s approach has been based on three key criteria: a holistic / best practice 
approach to disaster risk reduction, timely action and community involvement.  
 
7.4.1 Taking a holistic / best practice approach to disaster risk 
reduction 
Samoa has taken a holistic approach in mapping its natural hazards and in 
incorporating the outcomes of their community consultation within their 
development plans. This has required considerable effort by central government. 
However it has ensured that any ensuing works will be carried out incorporating 
developmental issues. This means that resilient infrastructure issues are not being 
carried out in isolation but alongside the developmental needs of the various 
communities. Clearly, as an extreme example, there would be little point in 
providing resilient roads if potable water could not be provided, or because crops 
could not be grown in-country (or the economic basis of the community were 
undermined in some way). Further, Samoa has followed the six themes outlined 
by the World Bank for planning resilient infrastructure, as detailed in section 6.1. 
By carrying out this process, Samoa has demonstrated that in terms of process, a 
holistic / best practice approach can be carried out.  
 
7.4.2 Timely action  
Samoa adopted its approach to disaster risk reduction in January 2001 (see 
section 4.2). Bearing in mind the complexity and effort involved in producing its 
Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans, it has made steady progress in the past 
twelve or so years. This indicates that the production of such plans takes time, 
even when resourced at levels that allows relatively constant progress. This is an 
aspect which other countries can learn from – that the development of such plans 
does take an extended time. Having carried out the work though, Samoa is now 
in a strong position to proceed with funding applications and potentially to 
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physical works. This is believed to be well in advance of many other Pacific 
Island nations.  
 
7.4.3 Community involvement  
With a population of 179,000 (2009 estimate), and with just over 40 villages, the 
scale of community consultation required in Samoa on the Coastal Infrastructure 
Management Plans would not have been as high as in many mainland Asian 
countries. On the other hand, such a population is well in excess of many other 
Pacific Island states, and in this respect, Samoa has demonstrated that 
community consultation on resilient infrastructure can essentially be carried out 
country-wide, if the government has the political will to undertake this task.  
 
 
7.5 Other resilience factors of note 
 
The following factors of note regarding disaster risk reduction are also worth 
considering, as a result of the experiences gained in the Samoas:  
 
7.5.1 Economic factors  
 
The ADB (2005 and 2008) supports a ‘risk based approach’ to Disaster Risk 
Reduction. Specifically, from the examples given in the texts, this appears to 
mean providing a calculated ‘Benefit Cost Ratio’ (BCR), or an economic 
assessment of the value of the risk reduction initiative for infrastructure 
investment. The use of, and calculation of, a BCR is discussed in Section 3.5.2.  
 
Whilst the use of BCRs provides a familiar measurement method (for engineers 
and governmental economists) for calculating the relative benefit of different 
potential projects, the calculation of a BCR may be skewed in a number of ways, 
principally regarding the rules given for its calculation. Most major infrastructure 
providers have their own rules for producing economic assessments. Most 
governments also have their own defined ‘discount rates’ to be used for the 
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calculation of BCRs. The discount rate is effectively the interest rate at which the 
government chooses to value money year-on-year. It is equivalent to the interest 
rate available at banks when investing money. A high interest rate implies a high 
rate of return, a low interest rate implies a low return on investing money. The 
United Kingdom and United States of America and other countries presently use 
a discount rate of 3-4% for infrastructure investment decisions. New Zealand 
presently uses a rate of 8% (NZIER, 2011). Although on the face of it an 
administrative decision, the discount rate strongly affects the desirability of 
future projects. With a low discount rate (say 3%), economic benefits realised by 
projects in the medium to long-term future (say, over 10 years) may be 
substantial. A higher discount rate makes short-term benefits (in the following 
five years) gain greater weight than longer-term benefits. This means that with a 
high discount rate (such as 8%) short-term decision-making predominates. Long-
term issues such as resilience of infrastructure, where natural hazards may have a 
massive effect, but only on 50- or 100-year cycles, using BCR calculations with 
medium or high discount rates, are given minimal weightings. A low discount 
rate allows for such long-term cycles to gain at least some realistic weighting.  
 
There are economic rationales for choosing to use a particular discount rate. 
Using a high discount rate provides a robust and quantifiable basis in many 
investment decisions, but as seen above downgrades long-term infrastructure 
resilience as an investment option. Therefore, if a government is to be focussed 
on long-term resilience, it may choose a long-term decision-making discount 
rate.  
 
7.5.2 Connectedness factors  
Whilst BCRs may provide economic justification for investing in infrastructure, 
some potential projects or actions simply will not achieve a favourable BCR. 
Without a favourable BCR, it can be difficult for a government or community to 
justify expense on an action. This can be a major consideration for more remote 
or smaller communities, for example. Consider a fishing village located 20km 
from a population centre, connected by land only by an infrequently used but 
adequate road. Based purely on an economic assessment, it may be that the low 
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use of the road, and the low economic activity at the village means that a BCR 
indicates that it is no longer a good investment decision to continue to maintain 
the road. Economically, therefore, it would be justified to allow the road to fall 
into disrepair, and for the community to eventually be cut off by road access. In 
terms of connectedness, this may however effectively make the long-term 
presence of that community impossible, without connection to the facilities that 
the larger population centre provides. A decision as to whether to maintain the 
road may therefore become a political decision, based not on economic 
justification, but on other factors such as cultural or community issues.  
 
Developing this idea further, an example of an upgrade to an existing road may 
be considered. Two routes appear viable, both costing approximately the same – 
one runs near to the coast, which makes the road vulnerable to coastal hazards. 
The other route runs partially through an urban area, but is seen to be resilient to 
natural hazards. In order to construct the road through the urban area, many 
existing residences would have to be removed or relocated. Again, it appears that 
in this fictitious situation, it would be a political decision for where to locate the 
upgraded section of road.  
 
With the two above examples it can be seen that, even with good information 
available, infrastructure resilience can become a political decision, affecting 
different sections of communities in different ways. It is not possible, in this 
thesis, to address adequately this issue, rather to acknowledge that some 
resilience issues may become political in nature.  
 
7.5.3 Measurements of resilience  
Whilst the above sections discuss economic and political issues, measures of 
resilience could potentially aid both economists and politicians in decision-
making for infrastructure resilience. As seen in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.2, there are 
presently no clear resilience or vulnerability measures. This makes infrastructure 
resilience a hard-to-define concept, and therefore one hard to make clear decision 
making on. Development of such measurements would provide a useful tool for 
the sector.  
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of this thesis is to explore governmental approaches to analysing 
infrastructure resilience and the means of mitigating against disaster, comparing 
the polices taken in Samoa to those in American Samoa. Through the literature 
review best practice for disaster risk management was identified, and the 
approaches taken in the two island groups were compared against that best 
practice. Whilst the technical details of the two approaches have produced their 
own sets of learnings, some themes have become apparent from a development 
studies standpoint.  
 
 
8.1 The importance and value of community participation 
‘Community participation’ is a developmental term that is widely encouraged, in 
concept, by many organisations, including the World Bank, UN agencies and 
NGOs (Desai, 2008). However, its effectiveness and use has sometimes been 
called into question, with some governmental organisations accused of 
manipulating communities, or process outcomes, for their own purposes (ibid). 
Samoa’s approach to disaster risk management is therefore an interesting and 
informative case. The Samoan government has made significant effort to engage 
with the community, and through this process has realised various benefits.  
 
Firstly, the understanding of hazards facing both communities and infrastructure 
have been refined. Whilst the technical staff working on disaster risk 
management in Samoa were able to identify some hazards, the community were 
able to give additional information on past events, and highlight their perceptions 
of risk. The resulting hazard mappings were therefore more robust, and of greater 
use to both governmental agencies and the community. Secondly, through 
discussions on the hazards, both the governmental agencies and communities 
were better able to plan future potential infrastructure upgrades, and to plan 
emergency responses. The community facing the hazard will therefore be better 
prepared, both physically (infrastructure) and organisationally (understanding 
actions to be taken in hazard events) for hazard events. This process also helps 
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the government plan, long term, infrastructure management. Through this 
process, a prioritised list of infrastructure upgrades was identified. This helps the 
government agencies concerned to make good choices on expenditure. Thirdly, 
the government can rightly point to a robust and inclusive process to potential 
financiers of infrastructure upgrades or, particularly relevant presently, financiers 
of climate adaptation and mitigation projects, such as through the Global 
Environment Facility (see Section 6.4). Finally, the government’s work on 
disaster risk management has been incorporated into village development plans. 
Therefore, the work on disaster risk management is not being carried out in 
isolation, but in conjunction with other work and issues, producing a holistic and 
encompassing response to issues.  
 
As can be seen therefore, the Samoan Government and community are better 
placed to react to hazard events, and are better placed to manage their high-cost 
infrastructure. This is a case of community participation being used as a process 
to achieve a positive outcome for all stakeholders. It would appear that when 
engineers talk to communities, good outcomes are possible.  
 
 
8.2 Policy focus on long-term horizons  
Samoa has taken a long term view on village development and disaster risk 
management through the development of infrastructure management plans 
(called asset management plans in the engineering profession). The holistic 
nature of the work of the Samoan Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MNRE), integrating the development needs of communities with 
potential disaster risk reduction works, will provide well-targeted and efficient 
programmes that suit the needs of the communities. By starting this work in 
2001, the MNRE are now at a stage where they can be applying for funding for 
physical works from international financing bodies. This demonstrates one aspect 
of disaster risk reduction and resilient infrastructure planning – that planning new 
infrastructure, retrofitting existing infrastructure, and allocating land to specific 
uses in town/land planning is a process that has to be viewed in the long-term. As 
the author of this thesis has seen from examples of seismic retrofitting work in 
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Christchurch carried out in the 1990s, engineers performing that work sometimes 
did not think that the benefits of their work would be seen within their lifetimes. 
Due to the earthquakes in Canterbury of 2010 and 2011, however, the value of 
the seismic retrofitting carried out are clear to see, just as the lack of seismic 
preparedness in other areas has also been visible.  
 
In consulting the community, the Samoan Government has taken another step. It 
has identified infrastructure upgrades which the communities involved have 
either suggested or agree with. This generally ensures that natural resources are 
not being degraded in favour of short-win infrastructure upgrades.  
 
This long term view, it appears, will achieve good outcomes for sustainable 
development, in the sense that the actions of the present generation, at local level 
in Samoa, will not be compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their needs. This strongly matches the ‘sustainable development’ philosophy 
concept encouraged in development sectors since the 1980s (Zoomers, 2008).  
 
 
8.3 Appreciating political / administrative processes 
Whilst the efforts made in disaster risk management in Samoa can be seen to be 
having significant future positive effects, it appears that this approach is not 
being adopted across the Pacific. The example shown in American Samoa 
demonstrates that in at least that context, disaster risk management efforts are 
being concentrated on climate change issues, with less community participation 
carried out on identification of hazards or in developing infrastructure or 
emergency response plans. American Samoa may not be unique in the Pacific in 
this respect.  
 
One of the initial thoughts in planning this thesis was whether any cause-effect 
factors found in the geopolitical histories of Samoa and American Samoa could 
be seen to have caused specific policy or tactical approaches to the delivery of 
disaster risk reduction and resilient infrastructure works. Samoa’s holistic, 
community based and timely approach represents both global best-practice and 
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an acknowledgement of the structure of the communities living there. American 
Samoa’s approach of focussing more specifically on climate change issues may 
be more of a reaction to intense debate in US political spheres in the 1990s and 
early 2000s regarding climate change, whether it ‘exists’ and what its effects 
may be. This may have skewed American Samoa’s thinking on disaster risk 
reduction generally, although that does not diminish the value of the work carried 
out on climate change issues, as they are likely to have a large effect on the 
nature, scale and intensity of storm events in the Pacific in the medium and long-
term future.  
 
Despite the skew towards a climate change focus in American Samoa, it appears 
that there have been no specific cause/effects from geopolitical histories that 
have impacted the political and tactical approaches taken in the two island states 
regarding disaster risk reduction.  
 
 
8.4 Lessons learnt from differing approaches  
Apart from the ‘development theory’ lessons learnt, as outlined above, there are 
some other factors that have appeared both from the literature review and the 
specific cases noted in the Samoas. These are:   
 
8.4.1 Carefully plan land use and new infrastructure with natural 
hazards in mind 
When planning new infrastructure, and as demonstrated in ADB’s case-studies 
for planning disaster risk reduction on Pacific Islands (ADB, 2005), designing to 
adapt for natural hazard events is possible. In the case studies presented, the 
ADB were able to demonstrate how the incremental cost of adapting to climate 
change could be calculated. Not all design or funding application processes will 
need to take this approach, particularly as it would effectively require double-
designing and costing aspects of infrastructure (once taking climate change into 
account, once not, and calculating the cost difference). The point of this issue is 
that careful planning and design can lead to much more cost effective and 
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community appropriate works, carried out once, without the often very expensive 
requirement of retrofitting or repairing damaged infrastructure. Infrastructure is, 
in terms of community budgets, often extremely expensive, and the costs of 
repairs can have huge impacts on community and central government budgets.  
 
8.4.2 Planning land use with natural hazards in mind is cost effective  
Pacific Forum papers, prepared by SOPAC (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
2009), demonstrated that economically, it is worth carrying out disaster risk 
reduction works. It is much more economically effective to properly plan works; 
however even retrofitting works can be economically efficient. This is a factor 
that will help to justify many sets of works, particularly to International Finance 
Institutions (the World Bank etc.).  
 
8.4.3 Economic efficiency is not the only measure of the value of 
disaster risk reduction  
It also has to be recognised, however, that in planning potential infrastructure 
upgrades, there are not just economic issues at work, but community and political 
ones too. This aspect is recognised in more sophisticated project prioritisation 
tools such as the New Zealand Transport Agency’s project prioritisation tool 
which grades not just (economic) efficiency, but also the ‘strategic fit’ and 
‘effectiveness’ of projects on a simple scoring of ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’. This 
can help to justify works to projects that would not otherwise attract a high 
economic justification, such as the protection of culturally important cemeteries 
or statues, as seen in the Samoan approach to the prioritisation of future 
infrastructure upgrades.  
 
8.4.4 Political aspects of choice of infrastructure upgrades   
As seen in section 7.5, decisions on infrastructure resilience may be hard to 
justify solely on economic grounds and therefore can be political in nature. This 
can lead to a lack of clarity as to why certain decisions are taken. It may be that, 
with long-term resilient infrastructure issues being taken alongside immediate 
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community needs, that infrastructure resilience is ‘put off’ in favour of the 
politically immediate community needs. This makes the concept of infrastructure 
resilience not only hard to measure, but also hard to politically justify over short-
term needs.  
 
8.5 Summarising lessons learnt 
Summarising all lessons learnt, both from the approaches taken in the Samoas 
and internationally, we see:   
 
8.5.1 Lessons learnt from the Samoas   
The following lessons were learnt through this thesis from the Samoan contexts:  
 
A holistic / best practice approach to disaster risk reduction, as outlined for 
example in the Bettencourt el al (2006) text, provides long-term benefits to 
communities and economies (see Section 4.5).  
 
Timely action commences initiatives, some of which may be long-term, such as 
the planting of vegetation. Delay on such initiatives lengthens the period in 
which communities remain at risk from identified hazards (see Section 3).  
 
As seen in the Samoa example, community involvement in the identification of 
natural hazards, and in planning disaster risk reduction measures is feasible, even 
at a whole of Pacific Nation (population around 170,000) level, and may produce 
robust decision making on disaster planning, both at government and community 
levels (see Section 4.2).  
 
 
8.6 Concluding words   
This thesis set out to investigate the issue of resilient infrastructure in the 
Samoas, and to see if geopolitical histories could have informed present 
infrastructure policies. No explicit cause-and-effect link was found between 
present policies and histories, although it was found that the approaches taken by 
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the two administrations are achieving very different results. Samoa has invested 
effort and some expense in community consultation on hazard identification and 
disaster risk management issues. This investment has already produced benefits 
in terms of community readiness to react to hazard events. It is likely that the 
investment will also produce benefits regarding long term plans for infrastructure 
management and disaster risk management.  
 
From a development studies point of view, the philosophies of community 
participation, and of long term sustainable approaches, can be seen to provide 
real benefits for the communities. Climate change, with the specific effects of sea 
level rise and climate variability, are causes for concern for Pacific states, 
however the approach taken by Samoa provides an example of how the 
administrations, at least of high-island states, may start to address these concerns.  
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Appendix 1 – Participants / Interviewees 
 
The following are those that participated in the original research of this thesis:  
 
Name Position Organisation Means of 
introduction 
Date / 
means of 
interview 
Samoa 
Michele 
Daly 
Team Leader, 
Social Sciences 
GNS Science, 
New Zealand 
Introduced 
by personal 
contact 
Structured 
face-to-face 
interview,  
4 May 2011 
Keith Frentz Technical 
Director, 
Planning 
Beca 
Engineering 
Consultants 
Introduced 
by Michel 
Daly 
E-mail 
exchange, 13 
May 2011 
Jude 
Kohlhase 
Assistance 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Planning and 
Urban Planning 
Agency, Samoa 
Introduced 
by Keith 
Frentz 
E-mail 
exchange  
31 May 
2011 
American Samoa 
Gene 
Brighouse 
Superintendent 
for Fagatele 
Bay NMS 
National 
Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
Introduced 
by Jude 
Kohlhase 
E-mail 
exchange 
10-17 June 
2011 
Emily 
Gaskin 
Policy Analyst National 
Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
Introduced 
by Gene 
Brighouse 
E-mail 
exchange 
10-22 June 
2011 
Kristine 
Bucchianeri 
 Department of 
Commerce 
Introduced 
by Gene 
Brighouse 
E-mail 
exchange  
2-7 March 
2012 
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